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ABSTRACT

A large number of systems that rely on the Internet pervasively launched into our
daily lives during the last decades. The openness and scalability of the Internet have
provided a flexible platform for private customers, professionals, and academics with
non-commercial or commercial interests. Therefore, there has been growing interest in
network security. Network or computer systems may employ anti-virus, firewall,
intrusion prevention system, or intrusion detection system to maintain the safe
environment. Among the systems, the intrusion detection system plays a very
important role in minimizing the damage caused by different attacks. The system
attempts to learn the features of behaviors and events of system and/or users over a
period time to build a profile of normal behaviors, then looks for malicious behaviors
that deviate from the normal profile. Thus, it is able to detect attacks even when
detailed information of the attack does not exist.
A wide variety of techniques were proposed to approach the system including
machine learning, data mining, hidden Markov models, and statistical analysis. This
research mainly considers the statistical analysis-based method due to the simplicity
and effectiveness. However, the method has a few disadvantages. First, the results are
not intuitive because it requires the related statistical background. Second, it is
difficult to integrate the results of different statistical analyses due to the different
ranges. Last, the methods provide only two states; normal or malicious behaviors.
This research proposes a trust management scheme as a solution to these
problems. A trust management scheme is able to scale the results of statistical analyses

between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable), so the results would not only be intuitive but
also be able to integrate the various results into one. Moreover, the trust values can
provide more than normal and malicious behaviors, such as a-little-suspicious,
suspicious, or highly-suspicious states.
We will show how well the trust management scheme can represent the results of
various statistical analyses, how the system can find the appropriate thresholds for
classifying the malicious behaviors in this dissertation. The proposed trust
management scheme will be applied to two real-world datasets, and we will discuss
the experiments results.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The internet along with the corporate network plays a major role in work/personal
use and has evolved into a global communication and service network. As of 2013,
83.3% of the United States households reported computer ownership, and 74.4% of all
households reported Internet use [1]. The openness and scalability of the Internet have
provided a flexible platform for private customers, professionals, and academics, with
non-commercial or commercial interests. For instance, electronic commerce, social
networking, and national infrastructure for which delivering oil, gas, power, and
water, rely on access to the information network. However, there exist various threat
sources and vulnerabilities including software bugs, operating system bugs, and
operating system misconfigurations. The number of the new threats continues to grow,
and the creation of new malware was observed an average of 230,000 new types each
day in the second quarter of 2015. Moreover, a total of 21 million new threats were
observed during the three months [2].

1.1 Problem Statement
In recent years, there has been growing interest in network intrusion detection due
to the emergence of various kinds of large-scale distributed systems, such as Internet,
server clusters, cellular networks, computer networks, distributed databases, network
file systems, etc. Networks are complex interacting systems, where failures and
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attacks are common. Therefore, network-monitoring systems that are used for
identifying, diagnosing and treating anomalies, have become a fundamental part of
network operations. Without this kind of monitoring systems, networks are not able to
operate efficiently or reliably. Anomaly detection is one of the intrusion detection
monitoring methods that characterizes known or unknown anomalous patterns of an
attack, a virus, or a malware. There are many proposals for anomaly detection
methods that are based on pattern, rule, state, integration, or statistical analysis of the
data that can be collected, for example, at the firewall of a given computer system.
Such data usually represents network flows that consist of transaction time, content
type, source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, IP
protocol, size of sent and received packets, source country, destination country, packet
contents, etc. The data will provide an accurate detection of malicious nodes if an
Anomaly Detection System (ADS) can analyze every network flow separately.
However, it might not be possible due to the physical and practical limits to the
amount of data storage and computation because the number of network flows are
huge. For instance, the data considered in this dissertation has been collected from one
of the network firewalls at the University of Rhode Island consists of more than 3.6
billion network flows during the 90 days from February 10th to May 28th. Since each
flow includes chunks of multiple packets that have been exchanged between a source
node and a destination node, the actual number of packets that have been observed
was much bigger than 3.6 billion. Thus, this dissertation attempts to reduce the dataset
to be analyzed to detect malicious behaviors.
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The term network refers simply to a collection of elements and their interrelations [3]. The relationships between the nodes in a network can be presented as a
graph, and it allows us to apply various graph theory techniques for a statistical
analysis-based Anomaly Detection System (ADS). One of the advantages of the graph
is that we can reduce the amount of data that needs to be analyzed because the
duplicate relationships between nodes can be presented on one edge in a graph. We
analyzed the generated graphs from network flows data with statistical analysis
methods that assume the normal data instances occur in high probability regions while
malicious data instances occur in low probability regions.
To create appropriate rules for decision-making about network node behaviors in
a dynamic network environment, we adopted an outlier detection method from the
financial analysis [4]. The nodes in a dynamic network environment, such as the
Internet, show different behaviors over time because the network topology changes
and nodes and/or edges may come and go. Thus, a threshold, which detects malicious
behaviors, needs to be dynamically selected depending on the given dataset, and we
used the outlier detection method to implement an adaptive threshold. The adaptive
threshold detects malicious behaviors and is used for a trust management scheme that
is introduced in next paragraph.
The concept of trust and the trust management schemes adopted from the social
science will help to express a large amount of past data implicitly by providing a
cumulative evaluation method for each node. Also, by construction the trust
management scheme will help to convert the various ranges of the graph-based node
characteristics and behaviors into a measure of trust with a fixed range of values
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between zero and one, where a value close to zero indicates less trustful while a value
close to one indicates more trustful. Since each statistical analysis method produces
different ranges of results, the related statistical background will be required to
understand the results. The big numbers may represent malicious behaviors in some
statistical analysis methods while the numbers can represent normal behaviors in some
methods. If we convert the results of each statistical analysis via the trust management
schemes, they can be expressed as understandable information without the related
statistical background in a fixed range of values between zero (less trustful) and one
(trustful). Using trust values computed from multiple node characteristics for the same
node can be integrated into one single measure that will reflect the overall level of
maliciousness of the node.
Note that in this dissertation, the trust scheme originally proposed by [5] has been
modified to allow indicating how close a behavior to the normal behavior and
malicious behavior.

1.2 Research goals
An efficient statistical analysis-based ADS needs to: a) store and analyze less
data, b) be able to deal with compressed, encrypted, or fragmented packets, c) show
low false positive rate, and d) create appropriate rules for decision-making about
network node behaviors in a dynamic network environment.
First of all, this dissertation uses graph-based statistical analysis method because
a graph can reduce the amount of data by presenting the relationships between nodes
on one edge, and the method focuses on the unencrypted and uncompressed part of the
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network packets, for example, the source IP address, destination IP address, source
port, and destination port. To implement the graph-based analysis, the ADS needs to
represent data as Network Graph(s). Second, we develop 1) a trust management
scheme to avoid erroneously labeling nodes with a few malicious behaviors and 2) an
outlier-based adaptive threshold to create appropriate rules for decision-making about
network node behaviors in a dynamic cyber environment. A statistical analysis method
detects malicious behaviors that occur in low probability regions, and the evaluation
should be careful to minimize its false positive rate. Moreover, the analysis should be
able to adapt to a dynamic network environment, such as the Internet, to maintain an
appropriate detection rate.
This dissertation aims to achieve the following goals. First, we will represent the
network flows dataset as Network Graph(s). Second, the behaviors of each node will
be characterized by using graph-based analysis. Third, the system will detect
malicious behaviors using statistical analysis method. Fourth, we will develop a
dynamic threshold method, so that the ADS can adapt to a dynamic cyber
environment. Last, each node will be evaluated based on aggregate behavior over time
to ensure that no one behavior causes the node to be labeled as malicious.

1.3 Data description
The proposed anomaly detection system will be evaluated using two different
datasets. The first dataset was collected by European Internet Service Provider in
2007, and the second dataset was collected at the firewall of the University of Rhode
Island (URI) computer network in 2014.
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The first dataset is the same dataset that was used by Ding et al. in [6] for intrusion
detection via community-based method (Section 2.2.2). The dataset contains network
flows collected by a European Internet Service Provider (ISP), sampled based on
1:1000 packet sampling rate, and stored over 14 days from May, 1st to May, 14th in
2007. Totally, 34,647,824 network flows were collected from 43,016 unique source
nodes to 1,449,598 unique destination nodes where each flow is represented by a
source port, a destination port, time and duration of the flow, and size in bytes and
packets. Additionally, the dataset contains DShield Logs obtained from a communitybased collaborative firewall log correlation system by the SANS Institute [7]. The
DShield Logs contains 9,724,227 unique IP addresses marked as possibly malicious.
Although not complete, DShield Logs have been proven to be useful for validation of
proposed intrusion detection methods in a number of studies [6], [12].
The second dataset, significantly bigger than the first dataset, contains network
flows that were collected by University of Rhode Island Information Technology
Service (URI-ITS) at one of the firewalls in the university, sampled based on 1:100
packet sampling rate, and stored from February 11th to May 22nd in 2014 for 90 days.
Totally, 36,986,233 network flows were observed that access from/to the University of
Rhode Island (URI) Network. 8,616 nodes belonged to the URI Network among
19,468,221 unique source nodes, and 31,279 nodes belonged to the URI Network
among 528,222 unique destination nodes where each flow is represented by a source
port, a destination port, time and duration of the flow, size in bytes and packets, a type
of application, a sequence number, an action, a flags, a source country, a destination
country, etc.
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There have been a few special events while collecting the flows. One of the
servers in URI network was attacked on March 6th, so the collection was stopped at
23:59:59. We started collecting the flows on March 11th again, but there was another
attack. The collection needed to be stopped at 06:15:57, and we started the collection
at 15:26:08 next day. We had to stop the collection at 15:27:23 on April 22nd again due
to another attack and resumed the collection at 12:00:50 on May 6th.

1.4 Dissertation Structure
Chapter 2 will present the background and related scholar research work in
statistical analysis-based Anomaly Detection System (ADS) and trust management
scheme. The chapter will give reviews of the types of intrusions, types of ADS, graph
theory, statistical analysis methods, adaptive threshold, and trust management scheme
that have been used in this dissertation. Chapter 3 will propose a new method for
detecting malicious nodes from network flows based on a statistical analysis-based
anomaly detection by representing the results by using trust. This chapter also
introduces an adaptive threshold that creates appropriate rules for decision-making in a
dynamic cyber environment. Chapter 4 will provide descriptions of each experiment
design and the results that have been composed for evaluating the goals of this
dissertation. The experiments will show 1) network graph can reduce the dataset, 2)
graph-based analysis can characterize each node’s behaviors, 3) the proposed trust
management scheme can be used to represent the statistical characteristics that we are
investigating, 4) the proposed adaptive threshold performs better than static thresholds
in a dynamic environment, and 5) the trust management will evaluate each node in
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aggregate and over time. Chapter 5 of this dissertation will discuss how this work has
met the goals specified in Section 1.2 and summarize findings for the experiments in
Chapter 4. The future direction of the research work is also discussed in the chapter.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A variety of methods has been proposed and developed for the purpose of
intrusion detection. Some methods detect malicious nodes by matching the traffic
pattern or the packets using a set of predefined rules that have been already known. On
the other hand, some methods monitor the behaviors over time and detect malicious
behaviors without the predefined rules. These methods can implement an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) and protect the system from various threats. This dissertation
approached the latter method to implement an IDS based on statistical analysis
methods.
This chapter presents the related works of this dissertation. Section 2.1 provides
an introduction to IDS. Section 2.2 discusses the statistical analysis-based anomaly
detection systems, the related definitions, the statistical analysis methods, and
terminology that are used in this dissertation. Section 2.3 introduces the related graph
theory, and Section 2.4 provides an introduction to trust management schemes that can
evaluate. Section 2.5 discusses an outlier detection method to implement an adaptive
threshold to create appropriate rules in a dynamic network environment, and Section
2.6 overviews the potential intrusions to computer and computer networks. Section 2.7
summarizes this chapter and discusses how the reviewed studies contributed to this
research.
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2.1 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
For a clear understanding of ADS, we need to know IDS first. In recent years, the
attacks have been sophisticated, and new vulnerabilities (known as Zero-day exploits)
are routinely brought. As complete prevention of computer attacks is not possible, the
IDSs play a very important role in minimizing the damage caused by different attacks.
An IDS is a special purpose device or software to detect suspicious behaviors, such as
unauthorized access to a computer system or a network. The concept of IDS was first
introduced by James P. Anderson [8] and formed by Dorothy Denning [9] in 1980 and
1987 respectively. An IDS audits activities performed in computer systems and
networks, then analyzes the data to find evidence of malicious behaviors. The
activities can be network packets, operating system calls, audit records produced by
operating system auditing facilities, or log messages produced by applications [10].
When IDS detects an attack, an alert that describes the type of the attack is provided.
There are two complementary trends in intrusion detection for IDS: misuse
detection and anomaly detection [11]. Misuse detection is also known as knowledgebased detection that aims to identify patterns of known bad behavior. On the other
hand, anomaly detection is known as behavior-based detection that builds a profile of
the normal operation from the historical data of the activities of system and/or users
that aims to look for abnormal behavior. These methods can be used together; a
“hybrid detection” that is based on both the normal behavior of the system and the
intrusive behavior of the attackers.
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2.1.1 Misuse Detection
The misuse detection method analyzes a system and/or user activities and tries to
find a match between the activities and the definitions or signatures of known attacks
that have been identified as bad behaviors [12], [13] . Thus, the misuse detection
method is commonly known as a signature-based method. This method requires
developing a knowledge database and a rule engine to detect intrusions.
This method is generally used in commercial products due to its advantages [14].
First, misuse detection method is very efficient in detecting attacks with usually high
levels of accuracy and with a minimal number of false positives [15]. Second, this
method can quickly detect specially designed intrusion tools and techniques. Last, it
provides an easy-to-use tool for maintaining and monitoring systems, even if an
administrator of the systems is not an expert in security [13].
However, there also exist disadvantages. First, misuse detection method can only
detect known attacks, so the systems must be updated with newly discovered attack
definitions or signatures. Second, since this method works on the basis of predefined
signatures, it is not able to detect attacks when they changed slightly and a variant of
the attacks is obtained, even if the attacks are well-known [13]. Last, misuse detection
method is not able to handle compressed, encrypted or fragmented packets because the
signatures cannot be verified.

2.1.2 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection method attempts to learn the features of behaviors and events
of system and/or users over a period time to build a profile of normal behaviors, then
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looks for malicious behaviors that deviate from the normal profile. Thus, anomaly
detection method is commonly known as a behavior-based method. Since the misuse
detection method is no longer accurate, this method is typically conceived as a more
powerful method in academic research due to its theoretical potential for addressing
novel attacks [14].
By using a collection of common activities of a user, anomaly detection method
builds Individual Profile and compares the user’s current behaviors to the profile with
little deviation from the expected norm. This may cover specific user events. Group
Profile is built by using a collection of common activities of a group, and it is
expected that each member in the group follows the group activity patterns. System
designers are able to build their own profiles for their purposes, such as resource
profiles or executable profiles [16].
The advantages of anomaly detection method are as follows [13], [17]. First,
anomaly detection method is able to detect attacks even when detailed information of
the attack does not exist. Second, this method can be used to obtain signatures or
definitions for misuse detection method [13]. Third, it is possible to handle
compressed, encrypted, or fragmented network packets because the method can be
implemented by analyzing the header information that does not be compressed,
encrypted, or fragmented in the Internet. Last, it is less dependent on operatingsystem-specific mechanisms [18]. On the other hand, anomaly detection method also
has disadvantages. First, the high false positive rate is generally cited as the main
disadvantage of anomaly detection method [13], [18]. Second, this method requires a
large set of training data in order to construct normal behavior profile and the
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detection is not available during the learning phase [13]. Moreover, behaviors can
change over time, so [18] emphasized the importance of the periodic on-line retraining
of the behavior profile.
A wide variety of techniques were proposed to approach the anomaly detection
problem including machine learning [19]–[23], data mining [24]–[30], hidden Markov
models [31]–[33], and statistical analysis [6], [34]–[39]. This research mainly
considers the statistical analysis-based method among these methods because it is
simple and effective to detect known and unknown attacks [28], [40], [41]. Besides,
the statistical analysis-based method does not require prior knowledge about normal
activity in order to set limits; instead it learns what constitutes normal activity form its
observations, and confidence intervals automatically reflect this increase knowledge
[9].

2.2 Statistical analysis-based Anomaly Detection System (ADS)
Statistical analysis-based ADS builds a representation of the network normal
behavior by using different features of the network traffic data. The system observes
the activity of subjects and generates profiles to represent their behaviors. Typically, it
maintains the two profiles that have been discussed in Section 2.1.2; the Individual
Profile and Group Profile. As new events occur, the method updates the current
profile and compares it to the previously built profile using some stochastic model
[42]. The statistical analysis-based ADS assumes that normal data instances occur in
high probability regions of a stochastic model while malicious data instances occur in
low probability regions of a stochastic model [43]. Numerous researchers have
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proposed the statistical analysis-based ADS, and [42] classified them into two
categories; packet-based and flow-based analysis.

2.2.1 Packet-based statistical analysis
Packet-based statistical analysis gathers information about individual packets, and
it analyzes the captured packets directly. Staniford et al. [38] proposed Statistical
Packet Anomaly Detection Engine (SPADE) that uses a simple frequency-based
approach. SPADE was specifically designed for detecting port scan attacks. It
observes the TCP SYN packets over a period time and maintains the anomaly score
depending on the frequency of a given packet has been seen. Javitz et al. [34] showed
a statistical analysis-based analysis that maintains statistical profiles, which are Q and
S statistics, to monitor normal behaviors. The Q statistic represents long-term
behaviors, and S statistic is deduced from the Q statistic. The S reflects the degree of
abnormality of recent behavior, and a node with high S value is classified as a
malicious node. When the most recent value for Q has a low probability of occurrence,
S has a large value, and vice-versa. In [44], Porras et al. proposed Event Monitoring
Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD). EMERALD
monitors the behaviors by using four statistical measures; discrete types, numerical
quantities, traffic intensity, and event distribution. In [39], [45], [46], the authors have
been interested in the actual contents of the network flows, which is called payload. In
[39] the Anagram detected malicious by using language-independent n-grams based
statistical analysis. 1-gram represents the network traffic model that is attack-free and
statistically analyzes byte-value frequency distributions [47]. The Anagram extended
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the method to the n-grams analysis that extracts from known malicious packets. To put
it again, the Anagram computes the mean frequency as well as the variance and
standard deviation of each ASCII character and compares to the recent packets. Even a
simple statistical analysis, such as histogram, can be used for detecting intrusions [48].
A Bayesian network also provides intrusion detection method with an approach
that models statistical dependencies and causal relationships between system variables
[49]–[51]. It represents the probabilistic relationships between variables (nodes) and
their conditional dependencies (links) via a directed acyclic graph. In Bayesian
approaches, conditional probabilities are used to predict the traffic class of network
events. Kruegel et al. introduced an event classification-based intrusion detection
scheme using Bayesian networks in [50]. The method built a decision network based
on special characteristics of individual attacks.

2.2.2 Flow-based statistical analysis
The processing and storage resources required for Packet-based analysis have
increased with the number of captured packets. Moreover, with growing use of
encrypted and/or compressed packets, the analysis methods have focused more on the
unencrypted part of the network packets, for example, the source IP address,
destination IP address, source port, and destination port. Based on the information,
researchers created network graph models to detect malicious behaviors. Akoglu et al.
claimed that graph-based approaches are vital and necessary for anomaly detection
systems for the following four reasons; inter-dependent nature of the data, powerful
representation, relational nature of problem domains, and robust machinery [52].
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Inter-dependent nature of the data: Most relational data could be interdependent, and it is necessary to account for related objects in finding
anomalies.



Powerful representation: The inter-dependencies could be represented by
links (edges) between the related objects. Graphs effectively capture the longrange correlations with the multiple paths. This enables representing the
incorporations of nodes and edge attributes/types.



Relational nature of problem domains: The inter-dependencies could exhibit
anomalies. For example, a failure of a machine could be an indicator of the
possible other failures of the machine or other machines.



Robust machinery: Attackers would not be able to disguise their malicious
behaviors without knowing the entire characteristics and dynamic operations of
the normal behaviors.

The graphs can be analyzed based on either structure-based or community-based
methods. The structure-based method identifies substructures in the graph and finds
malicious connections. In [53], the authors proposed a Graph-based hierarchical IDS
(GrIDS), which aims to detect network-wide intrusions that involve connections
between many nodes. GrIDS construct activity graphs representing hosts and network
activity, and models an organization as a hierarchy of departments and hosts. Choi et
al. visualized the structures of attacks by using parallel coordinates in [37]. The
method displayed several network attacks, such as Denial of Service, Slammer, Host
scan, and Port scan attacks, on the plane of parallel coordinates by using source IP
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address, destination IP address, destination port, and the average packet length
information in a flow.
The community-based method finds connected groups of nodes in the graph and
looks for malicious behaviors. Sun et al. developed a method that finds outliers based
on network clustering method [54]. The authors calculated the core-connectivitysimilarity for each edge in the graph and used a network clustering method, SCAN
[55], to find the minimum threshold for the outliers. Ding et al. proposed a
community-based anomaly detection system in [6]. The paper proposed a detection
system for malicious sources that uses the definition of intrusion in a social
environment, mainly in order to characterize all the nodes in the network flows.
This dissertation has its foundations in the work of the flow-based statistical
analysis over the packet-based statistical analysis because of the advantages of the
flow-based analysis. First, this analysis method requires less processing and storage
resources than the packet-based statistical analysis. The method analyzes the header
information that identifies the source and destination of each packet, and the duplicate
relationships between nodes will be presented on one edge in a graph. Second, this
method also analyzes the header information that is an unencrypted part of the
network packets. Third, it allows us to apply various graph theory techniques for
statistical analysis methods.

2.2.3 Problems
As we discussed in Section 1.1, the statistical analysis-based method has a few
disadvantages. First, the results are not intuitive. The method in [34] provides two
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statistical results, which are Q and S statistics, and the human supervisors are required
to interpret the results with the relative statistical background because the results are
not intuitive whether the number represents normal or malicious, and how big of a
number can be considered as a malicious behavior. Second, it is difficult to integrate
multiple statistical analysis results into one because the statistical analyses generate
the results in different ranges. For instance, the degrees and betweenness centrality can
be any number while the clustering coefficient generates a number between 0 and 1.
Last, the statistical requires a threshold when they detect malicious behaviors. SPADE
[38] used one of the static thresholds between 9 and 15 to find malicious nodes, and
the results varied depending on each threshold. Besides, the method provides only the
normal and malicious states but does not provide how close to normal or malicious.
Anagram [39] also depends on the static similarity threshold between the profiled
attack payloads and the recent payloads. This method might provide various states
depending on how similar the recent payload is to the profiled known attack payloads.
However, when a smart attacker manipulates the payload, it would not be possible to
detect the attack. The parallel coordinate method [37] provides fast detection method
with very nice visualization, but it also requires static thresholds for each attack and
provides only the normal or malicious states. The community-based anomaly detection
method [6] depends on statistical analysis results for detecting intruders. The research
showed betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient are good indicators of the
intruders. However, the results require knowledge of sophisticated statistical concepts.
This dissertation proposes a trust management scheme as a solution to these
problems. A trust management scheme is able to scale the results of statistical analyses
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between 0 and 1, so the supervisor will know how much the recent behavior or
accumulated behaviors are close to the normal or malicious behaviors. Since the trust
management scheme scaled the results of various statistical analyses within the same
range, they also can be integrated into one with a sophisticated method. Moreover, the
trust management scheme will provide more than normal and malicious states, such as
a-little-suspicious, suspicious, or highly-suspicious states. For the last problem, we
employed an adaptive threshold as the solution.

2.3 Network graphs
Frequently ‘network’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘graph’ since
networks are most commonly represented in a formal manner using graphs of various
kinds [3]. The subfield of mathematics known as graph theory provides a body of
definitions, tools, techniques, and results for discussing graphs and their properties. In
this section, we introduce some relevant network graph models that can represent
network flows and the techniques that can characterize network node behaviors.
This dissertation has its foundation on a graph-based and a community-based
anomaly detection system that has been proposed in [6]. The authors proposed a
detection system for malicious sources that uses the definition of intrusion in a social
environment, mainly in order to characterize all the nodes in the network flows. The
authors used the bipartite network graph, bipartite network projection, degree,
clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality for the measures in the paper and
showed that the malicious nodes tend to have relatively high degree, the low clustering
coefficient and high betweenness centrality.
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2.3.1

Bipartite network graph

Figure 1. Bipartite graph representation

A bipartite network is a graph

G  (V1,V2 , E) , where

and

are two disjoint

sets of nodes respectively the top and bottom nodes in Figure 1, and each edge in E
has one endpoint in

and the other in

. This graph is used for representing

‘membership’ networks. Each edge has endpoints of differing sets, but not between
nodes in the same set [3]. Bipartite graphs can represent several types of real-world
data, and Sun et al. claimed that the graph can show interesting characteristics of the
networks [52], [56], [57].



Internet: In a network traffic bipartite graph, the edges represent the
connections between a source node to a destination node, and the differing sets
are a group of source nodes and a group of destination nodes. The graph of
connections between source nodes and destination nodes can be direct
evidence of network attacks, such as Denial of Service, Hostscan, or Portscan
attacks [6], [37].



P2P systems: The endpoint in

is a set of files, and the other in

is a set of

peers. The graph shows the popularity of each file and point of interests of
each peer depending on the set of files [56].
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Stock markets: Each set represents the traders and stocks respectively. The
edges show the actions of buying and selling, and it can represent the
characteristics of the traders and stocks. Besides, it will be useful to identify
abnormal traders [56].



Research publications: The authors and conferences from

and

respectively, and the publication relationships were modeled by the edges. The
graph can be used for grouping the authors depending on the field of interests
and will show the active authors in the field [56]. The research publication
bipartite graph can represent the citation networks as well.

As we discussed in Section 2.2.2, the graph-based statistical analysis is interested
in the relationships between the source and destination nodes. The network flows can
be represented by source nodes (

) and destination nodes (

), and the nodes

constitute the two disjoint sets. Moreover, each flow has one endpoint in the source
node set and the other in the destination set (E). Considering these facts, the definition
of the bipartite graph shows that the graph is enough to represent the network flows
datasets.

2.3.2 Degree
In graph theory, the degree represents the number of edges from the vertex and to
the vertex. In network analysis, it shows the number of connections from a source
node to the destination nodes [3]. This can be very valuable information that could
indicate that a source node is an attacker or that a destination node has been attacked
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by an attack that usually shows high degrees (i.e. DDoS, probing, etc.). In Figure 1,
are two disjoint sets of nodes respectively the top and bottom nodes, and each

and

edge in E has one endpoint in
S11 in the group

and the other in

. Each source nodes from S1 to

has out-degrees 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, and 1. On the other hand,

each destination nodes from D1 to D4 has in-degrees 3, 4, 3, and 3.

2.3.3

Bipartite network projection

Figure 2. Bipartite network projection of Figure 1 network

A bipartite network projection is an extensively used method for compressing
information in a bipartite network. If nodes a and b share at least one common
destination, they are connected in the bipartite network projection [58]. So that the
projection discovers the community structure of a bipartite network. For the examples
in Section 2.3.1, 1) the projection of the Internet shows the groups of the source nodes,
2) it creates different groups based on the interests in P2P systems, 3) the Stock
market presents the groups of interests in the fields and stocks, and 4) the projection of
the Research publications can model the co-authorships. Figure 2 shows the one mode
projection of the Figure 1 network. The bipartite network projection-based community
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detection approaches were proposed by [6], [57], [59]–[64]. Ding et al. formed a
projection graph to identify communities in the network and utilized it to find
malicious nodes, which do not respect community boundaries in [6].

2.3.4

Clustering coefficient

Figure 3. Clustering coefficient

In graph theory, a clustering coefficient is a metric that quantifies the degree how
much the nodes densely connected each other in a graph and tend to cluster together.
Clustering coefficient was introduced in social network analysis [65]. The authors
presented two versions of clustering coefficient; global and local. Global clustering
coefficient is based on the triangular connections between neighboring three nodes and
gives an indication of the clustering in the network while Local clustering coefficient
gives an indication of the embeddedness of single nodes [65]. In network analysis, it
can be a measure of how source nodes tend to create tightly knit groups [3]. The
clustering coefficient can be calculated by observing the number of triangles (3-loops)
that pass through a node and the maximum number of 3-loops that could pass through
the node.
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≔

(1)

[6] showed that low clustering coefficient can be a measurement of intrusion,
which has the tendency to not respect community boundaries. The low clustering
coefficient represents whether the node is a member of weakly tied communities and
high clustering coefficient represents whether the node is a member of tightly tied
communities. For instance, one triangle that passes through node N2 (N2-N3-N4) is 1,
and the maximum number of triangles that could pass through b is 3 (a-b-c, a-b-d, b-cd), then

Cb 

1
3

In Figure 2, each node from S1 to S11 has the following clustering coefficient
values.

Node

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

CC

1

0.4

1

1

1

0.4

1

1

0.33

1

1

Table 1. Clustering coefficient of each node

We need to note that the nodes with less than two neighbors are assumed to have
a clustering coefficient of 0 or Not a Number (NaN). This research analyzes the
clustering coefficients and characterizes the nodes that are not densely tied in its
communities.
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2.3.5 Betweenness centrality
In graph theory, a betweenness centrality is a measure of a centrality of a vertex
within a graph and quantifies the number of times a node acts as a bridge along the
shortest path between two other nodes. In network analysis, it can measure the amount
of connections of a node to the communities in a network flow [3]. High betweenness
centrality represents the nodes that connected to many communities, which do not
respect community boundaries [6]. For instance, I may access to many web pages and
servers that belong to the University of Rhode Island because I am a student at the
university. If my computer has tried to access the servers that belong to the Boston
University, Brown University, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, University of Connecticut, and many other universities, my computer
would be the bridge among the communities in each university when we present the
relationships in a graph. In this case, many shortest paths will pass my computer, and
it will increase the betweenness centrality.

2.4 Trust
Trust is an important but complex concept in social science, which represents a
directional relationship between two parties that can be called trustor and trustee. It
helps people to make assessments and decisions in unpredictable circumstances by
reducing the uncertainty [66]. Trust is also a very important feature for network-based
systems that have nodes, which need to interact with one other. In order to facilitate
interactions in such system, trust must be addressed for the successful cooperation of
nodes in systems such as the internet, wireless sensor networks, e-marketplaces, the
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Grid, or peer-to-peer network systems. A trust management scheme manages
reputations of each node in a system. The main purpose of a reputation system is to
differentiate the states of the nodes in a system depending on each node’s behaviors.
This section introduces trust management schemes and trust computation methods.

2.4.1 Trust management schemes
Michiardi et al. proposed Collaborative Reputation mechanism protocol (CORE)
with the concept of reputation in order to evaluate each node’s contribution to the
network in [67]. CORE focused on detecting Denial of Service attacks in a wireless
sensor network system by using subjective (observation), indirect (positive reports by
others), and functional (task-specific behavior) reputations. These are formed and
updated with time by direct observations and reported information from other nodes
by weighted trust technique [68]. Buchegger, et al. [69], [70] have proposed
“Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks” (CONFIDANT).
By adopting Bayesian reputation [5] and trust system, it allows second-hand
evaluations. CONFIDANT uses both direct observation of a node and the second-hand
information from other nodes by weighted trust technique. This helps to evaluate a
neighboring node, and the reputation is used to isolate the malicious nodes from its
network [68]. DiPippo et al. proposed Secure Adaptive Routing Protocols (SARP) in
[71]. SARP provides a multi-dimensional trust evaluation mechanism that can adapt to
dynamic changes in the trust values of nodes in the network to route data from a data
source to a base-station. The research used multiple behavioral evaluation methods
and represented them by using a trust management scheme; forwarding trust, reporting
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trust, availability trust, loop trust, and overall trust. The authors also presented that
multiple evaluation results can be integrated into one, and they were able to efficiently
find malicious nodes in the network by using the integrated trust. Chae et al. proposed
REdeemable reputation based Secure Routing Protocol (RESRP) in [66] that extends
the SARP to provide flexible and additional defense scheme against On-off attacks,
which attempt to disturb trust management schemes by behaving well and badly
alternatively [72], [73]. The authors proposed a new trust management scheme and
successfully integrated with the previously proposed trust management scheme, which
is SARP.
As shown in these examples, trust management schemes are the tools that manage
reputations of each node’s behaviors to find malicious nodes. The CORE [67] showed
that the trust can be used for detecting network attacks, and the CONFIDANT [69],
[70] showed how trust is able to use not only the direct observations but also indirect
observations. The SARP [71] successfully integrated multiple trust values, and
RESRP [68] showed that the trust management scheme can be easily extended.
Moreover, trust management schemes can provide the solutions for the first and
second problems that have been discussed in Section 2.2.3; the results of statistical
analyses are not intuitive and difficult to integrate multiple analysis results into one.
First, it can generate results between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable), which can be
understandable for the human supervisors without having the related statistical
background. Second, the results generated by various statistical analyses can be
integrated into one value because they will be converted in the same range.
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2.4.2 Beta Reputation
Bayesian framework relies on ratings, either positive or negative, and use
probability distributions, such as the Beta distribution, to come up with reputation
scores [5], [74]. The goal of a Bayesian framework is to predict the future behavior of
a node whether it will be normal or malicious. By analyzing the probability that the
expectation lies within an acceptable level of error, reputation can be determined. The
framework has a parameter θ, which is calculated from the observations of the node’s
prior behaviors, that represents the probability of the node will be normal or malicious
on the next behavior.
The beta reputation system [5] is based on statistical updating of beta probability
density functions (PDF), which is based on the Bayesian framework. The current
reputation score is computed by using the combination of the previous reputation
score with the new behavior. The reputation score is represented in the form of the
beta PDF parameter tuple (α, β), where α and β represent the fulfillment of positive
and negative behaviors respectively. The beta distribution

| ,

can be expressed

by using the gamma function Г as:
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0

1 [75]. The probability expectation value of the beta

distribution is given by

28

E p ≔

(3)

, where the α and β represent the positive rating and negative rating respectively. The
Beta reputation set the α as the rate of positive behaviors
observed negative behaviors

plus 1, where

,

plus 1 and β as the rate of

0. Hence, the trust value can

be predicted by following equation.

≔

1
2

(4)

2.4.3 Predictability Trust
The beta reputation can have a behavior-based redemption feature. To understand
the behavior-based redemption, assume that a friend had a bad behavior in the past,
but since then the friend has behaved very well several times. Thus, we can expect that
the friend will behave well in the next behavior [66]. Similarly, if a node behaves
normal several times, we can expect the node will behave well in the next behavior
even if the node showed a few malicious behaviors in the past. However, the behaviorbased redemption may not allow a node to regain the trust after being blocked by
systems due to a few malicious behaviors because the method relies on subsequent
behaviors. If the malicious behaviors have been caused by unintentional temporary
errors or an attacker has used fake identifications, it might affect many normal users.
Thus, it needs to be cautious before blocking nodes that showed a few malicious
behaviors. Moreover, the behavior-based redemption can be disturbed by a smart
attacker who wants to remain active in the system by disguising the malicious
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behaviors as temporary errors. The attacker can disguise the malicious behaviors by
being normal and malicious alternatively so that trust is always redeemed before
another attack occurs. This type of attack is referred as an On-off attack [66]. This
dissertation refers to a nN-mM On-off attack when a node performs n normal and m
malicious behaviors alternatively. For instance, if a node showed 4 normal behaviors
after 1 malicious behavior, it is a 4N- 1M On-off attack node.
Chae et al. proposed Predictability trust (PRT) to provide defense against On-off
attacks in [66], [68]. The authors developed Dynamic Sliding Windows (DSW) that
change the size of the sliding windows depending on the current reputation. They used
the DSWs for providing efficient and flexible trust management scheme and
successfully detected and defended against On-off attacks.

2.4.3.1.

Predictability Trust Calculation

The PRT is computed based on how well a node’s behavior meets expectations.
This model is based on the probability distribution over the binary events, which are
normal or malicious behaviors. For instance, if a node showed either higher out-degree
than the system designer’s expectation or higher port-degree than the system
designer’s expectation, the system will consider that the node showed a malicious
behavior, which is hostscan attack or portscan attack respectively, and we set the event
as Malicious Predictability Behavior (MPB). On the other hand, if the node behaved as
the system designer expected, we set the event as Normal Predictability Behavior
(NPB). The PRT counts the number of NPB and MPB, and computes the trust as in (5),
using the formula of Beta reputation system in (4).
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≔

2

(5)

Chae et al. showed that a system designer might accept a certain level of damage
risk to maintain the desired effectiveness of the system in [66]. When the system
detects an On-off attack that causes little damage, for instance, 20N-1M On-off attack,
it may be allowed being active in the system. The authors have proposed dynamic
sliding window to achieve this goal.

2.4.3.2.

Sliding Windows

Sliding Window (SW) is a tool for evaluating neighbor nodes, and the main
purpose is to keep track of the past behaviors of a node. It would be the best practice if
we could store and observe the entire behaviors of each node, but this is unattainable
because a system has limited storage and processor speed. For these reasons, Chae et
al. employed SW, which allows a certain number of behaviors to be stored, in [66],
[68]. A SW updates and stores the latest behavior history by removing the oldest
observation in its memory when there is a new observation. In the papers, they
implemented two types of SW for the PRT: a fixed sliding window for normal
behaviors (NBW) and a dynamic sliding window for malicious behaviors (MBW).
The NBW and MBW keep track of both normal and malicious behaviors. Thus, the
number of normal behaviors in a NBW and the number of malicious behaviors in
MBW are affected by both normal behaviors and bad behaviors. When a new behavior
is observed and stored, it pushes out the oldest behavior from both windows.
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Therefore, this structure allows behavior based redemption, so even if a node had
several malicious behaviors, but it is not blocked by the security system, the PRT of
the node can be recovered after several normal behaviors. Besides, the NBW and MBW
will keep the latest behaviors because the first feature discards the oldest behaviors
from the windows. Thus, the system designer can manage the system as the fresh
information. Last, this structure requires more number of malicious behaviors to detect
a patterned attack than the Separated structure and Mixed structure. This allows the
system to be more circumspect for discriminating malicious nodes.

Figure 4. Normal Behavior Window (NBW)

a) Normal Behavior Window: The main purpose of the NBW is to observe the
number of normal behaviors among the stored behaviors. A NBW stores both normal
and malicious behaviors, but it counts only the number of normal behaviors. This
makes it possible to consider only the fresh normal behaviors while keeping in mind
the overall pattern of behaviors in the recent past. A system designer is able to provide
a specific number of opportunities for malicious nodes by setting the size of NBW
[66].
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Figure 4 shows how the NBW works. The top part of the figure shows the initial
status of a NBW with a size of five, and the NBW kept four normal behaviors and one
malicious behavior. The bottom part of the figure shows the same window after four
more behaviors. In this figure, the behavior history in the storage is represented by the
white boxes, so it removes any behaviors in the shaded boxes. The boxes on the left of
the “Current” arrow are the past behaviors that it stores in the storage. The box that
the arrow points out is the latest behavior, and the boxes on the right side of the arrow
represent space for future behaviors that have not occurred yet. In this example, the
number of normal behaviors changed from four to three after four behaviors in 2N-1M
attack [66].

Figure 5. Changes of size in Malicious Behavior Window (MBW) depending on
the current trust

b) Malicious Behavior Window: The authors were more interested in the
malicious behaviors than the normal behaviors because they are harmful to the system,
and the primary purpose of PRT is to detect malicious nodes. However, to avoid
erroneously labeling nodes as malicious, we need to be cautious in discriminating the
malicious nodes. For these reasons, the authors developed a MBW that allows us to
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observe more previous malicious behaviors depending on the current trust value. So as
trust decreases the size of MBW increases as shown in Figure 5.
A MBW stores normal and malicious behaviors but counts only the number of
malicious behaviors. The size of the window changes dynamically as the trust of the
node changes, and a system designer is able to set a maximum window size for the
MBW. Chae et al. performed a set of analytical tests that indicate the tolerance to
attack for a given maximum window size and discussed the analytical results in [68].
By referencing the analytical results, a system designer is able to determine how much
damage the system can tolerate and set the MBW maximum size accordingly [66].

≔

(6)
≔

(7)

≔

While the system designer set the maximum and minimum MBW size, the
dynamic size of the MBW is computed by (6), where 0.0
1.0, and the i and j are computed using simultaneous equations (7). By
adjusting the values of MaxTrust and MinTrust, the designer can affect the range of
the size for the MBW [66].
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Figure 6. Malicious Behavior Window (MBW)

When a node observes a malicious behavior, the current trust gets lower. Since
the MBW wants to observe more number of previous behaviors when the trust is low,
it increases the size of the window. Figure 6 shows an example how the MBW works.
When a malicious behavior was observed from a node, the current trust for the node
gets lower. In Figure 6, we see on the top a window size of five with one malicious
behavior. Thus, we want to observe more number of previous behaviors. Later, as
presented in the window on the bottom of the figure, two more malicious behaviors
have occurred. The MBW size has increased because the malicious behavior lowered
the trust of the node so that we can count three malicious behaviors in the MBW while
the NBW in Figure 4 allows us to count only two malicious behaviors.
One of the advantages of the PRT is that the method is able to provide long-term
observation-based second chances to each node and allow a certain level of risk in
order to maintain the efficiency of the system [66], [68]. For instance, if an attacker
hides/disguises the IP addresses of the attack nodes or composes attacks behind a
device such as VPN or Proxy server as we discussed in Section 2.6.2, the system still
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allow the other normal users could connect to the system by taking a certain amount of
risks.
However, the trust management schemes still require thresholds to evaluate a
behavior whether it is normal or malicious. This dissertation uses an outlier method to
provide adaptive thresholds for the trust management scheme.

2.5 Outlier-based adaptive threshold
Even though trust management schemes can provide a method to avoid
erroneously labeling nodes with a few malicious behaviors, the methods still have an
issue that the evaluation method depends on thresholds. It is not easy to set an
appropriate threshold in a dynamic environment, such as the Internet because if a
threshold is too high, malicious nodes cannot be detected while a low threshold has a
possibility that normal nodes would be classified as malicious. One of the proposed
ways to solve this issue is adaptive threshold method.
Adaptive threshold method was proposed in [76] and is also known as timevarying threshold method. The method adjusts its thresholds depending on the recently
collected data sets. An outlier is something that does not belong to any existing group
or class. The method computes outlier factor of every point in the dataset based on the
nearest neighborhood it has [77]. Many researchers have proposed ADSs based on the
outlier detection methods [78]–[80].
An outlier can be defined as an observation point that is distant from other
observations [81], [82], and it may indicate a systematic error, faulty data, or
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erroneous procedures. Since outliers occur in low probability region, this research
considered them as anomalous and malicious behaviors.

Figure 7. Log scaled host-degree distribution for one day of data
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Figure 8. Log scaled port-degree distribution for one day of data

Figure 9. Log scaled betweenness centrality distribution for one day of data
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Figure 7, 8, and 9 show the distribution of host-degree, port-degree, and
betweenness centrality for one day of the European dataset (Section 1.3) respectively,
and they showed heavy-tailed distributions. A heavy-tailed distribution has heavier
tails than the exponential distribution, and it is common within computer systems from
degree distributions in the internet and social networks to file sizes and interarrival
times of workloads [83]. The right tail of the distribution is of interest because it is the
low probability region that malicious data instances occur (Section 2.2). For instance,
the maximum host-degree was 6,455 in the European dataset, and it represents that the
node attempted to access to 6,455 different IP addresses in a day. As shown in the
following simple equation, 6455⁄ 24

60

4.5 , the node attempted to access

average 4.5 different IP addresses every minute, and the behaviors of the node cannot
be considered as normal. Besides, the maximum port-degree was 14,186 in the
European dataset, and this also represents the node attempted to access to average 9.85
different
14186⁄ 24

ports

every

60

9.85.

minute

by

the

following

simple

equation,

Schluter et al. [4] proposed a method that identifies multiple outliers in heavytailed distributions, and we employed this method to implement the adaptive threshold
for the trust management scheme. The authors treated the problem of multiple outlier
detections in heavy-tailed distribution through outward testing using the k most
extreme order statistics. In other words, if we consider a sample of size n and the
associated order list is

,

,

⋯

,

⋯

,

, the method finds the k

extreme order statistics that might not belong to the population of interest.
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A sequence of null hypotheses was indexed by κ and noted as
2, … and the

order statistic

,

,

, where k = 1,

belongs to the population of interest. The dataset

is tested sequence of null hypotheses

,

,

,

,…,

,

. The outlier point k was

specified if Ri, ri exceeds the critical level δ-1/α, where δ is the size of tests.
The Ri is a ratio of order statistics, and the authors compared this statistical results
because the ratios converge for heavy-tailed distributions extreme spacings diverse
and are dependent [4].

,

≔

(8)

,

,and the ri is the individual critical level for the overall test to have size δ.

≔ 1

/

1

/

(9)

, where the α is the nuisance parameter. The α is estimated by the Hill estimator [84].
However, the original Hill estimator requires a specific number of extremes to be
included for estimation. Thus, Schluter et al. [4] modified the Hill estimator.

≔

1

1
1

1
1
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1

(10)

,where the κ is the number of extremes. The authors noted that there are more
sophisticated methods to robustly estimate the tail parameter, but the tail index is just a
nuisance parameter for this method [4]. Therefore, they referred (10) as an estimator.
If Ri and ri of
,

,

do not exceed the critical level δ-1/α, the next null hypothesis

will be tested with

. The test will be continued until the first outlier is

detected or the sample maximum has been tested.
We note that the outlier-based adaptive threshold method cannot be applied to the
clustering coefficient because the clustering coefficient does not show the heavy-tailed
distribution as shown in Figure 10. Thus, we decided to set a static threshold only for
the clustering coefficient analyses. The static threshold has been decided based on a
statistical analysis that can maximize the efficiency of the detection. The detailed
statistical analysis is presented in Section 4.3. Also, the zero clustering coefficient
values were excluded from the analysis because it represents there was not enough
connections to evaluate the node with the clustering coefficient (Section 2.3.4).
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Figure 10. Distribution of clustering coefficients
The outlier point of a dataset will be used to set our adaptive threshold method for
the trust management scheme. The outlier point will be a threshold that classifies
malicious behaviors, and the statistical results of the rest of the behaviors will be used
for another threshold that classifies normal behaviors. The detailed usage will be
described in Section 3.2.

2.6 Intrusion overview
An intrusion to computer and computer network is any unauthorized activity that
attempts to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability on a computer or a
computer network. The system intrusions may cause the following dangers. First,
personal data can be stolen. In [16], the authors warned that the digital personal data
loss is more dangerous threats to people than physical personal data loss because
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people can know the physical data loss and can take precautions, but in digital loss,
people may even never know that their data was stolen. Second, privacy can be
compromised. In these days the information about an individual is stored online, such
as credit and debit cards, personal address, phone numbers, etc. Once the systems that
store the information is compromised, the privacy of those individuals is compromised
as well. Last, the compromised systems can be a part of cybercrime. A cracker who
breaks into your system might use the system for the purpose of cybercrime.
In order to detect intrusions, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how
attacks work. This section presents an introduction to potential intrusions to computer
and computer networks. Among the various attacks, this research focuses on the
Hostscan and Portscan attacks, which can be easily detected by the statistical analysisbased IDS.

2.6.1 Scanning attacks
This research considers the hostscan and portscan attacks because they are
relatively easy to detect by using the statistical analysis-based IDS. Scanning is a
technique for discovering available target nodes and the target nodes’ open ports. By
sending port probes, which are disguised as client requests, to a range of target IP and
port addresses. Although sometimes system administrators use this technique to verify
security policies of their network systems, the technique is used by attackers to
identify running services on a target node with the aim of exploiting a known
vulnerability of that service.
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Choi et al. defined nine graphical signatures, which are the Portscan, Hostscan,
Worm, Source-spoofed DoS (port fixed), Backscatter, Source-spoofed DoS (port
varied), Distributed hostscan, Network-directed DoS, and Single-source DoS, in [37].

2.6.1.1.

Hostscan

Figure 11. Hostscan [37]

An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is a numerical label assigned to each
device and identifies each device in a network for communication. An attacker or a
worm virus may scan multiple IP addresses to find victim machines, which provide a
known vulnerable service. Hostscan is a technique for discovering available target
nodes and the target nodes’ open ports. As shown in Figure 11, the attacker sends port
probes, which are disguised as client requests, to the same port on a range of target IP
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addresses, the attacker is aware of a particular vulnerability and tries to find
susceptible machines. The most common are SYN scans and ACK scans but other
TCP flags combinations can be used [85]. This dissertation assumes that the hostscan
nodes will show high out-degrees and low port-degrees.

2.6.1.2.

Portscan

Figure 12. Portscan [37]
Network ports are the entry points to a machine that is connected to the Internet.
Through a port, a service is able to communicate with a client application, process
requests and send responses back. An attacker may sometimes exploit vulnerabilities
in the server code so the attacker can obtain access to sensitive data or execute
malicious code on the server remotely. Portscan is a technique for discovering
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available target nodes’ available ports. As shown in Figure 12, this probes several
destination ports on a single target node. If the attacker naively scans a target node, it
is easy to detect because even the target node can detect the attack without any support
from other machines. This scan frequently carried out via UDP [85]. This dissertation
assumes that the portscan nodes will show low host-degrees and high port-degrees.

2.6.1.3.

Hybrid-scan

Figure 13. Hybrid Scan
Hybrid scan is a technique that probes several destination ports on several target
nodes. In [86], the authors described that this method can yield a hit-list, which is a
collection of potentially vulnerable target nodes, for future exploitation. This
dissertation assumes that the hybrid-scan nodes will show high host-degrees and high
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port-degrees. In other words, the node will show low degree trust and low port degree
trust.
Since these types of attacks attempt the relatively large number of connections
[37] or do not respect the community boundaries [6], this research will detect the
attacks by using flow-based analysis and graph-based methods as we discussed in
Section 2.2.2.

2.6.2 Deception of identity
The flow-based analysis method inherits the disadvantages of the ADS. An
attacker may disturb the method and increase the false positive rate (Section 2.1.2) by
forging the identity. When a system connects to the Internet, the Internet Service
Provider (ISP) assigns an IP address to the system. The system’s activity can be
tracked with the IP address, and the IP address can specify the location of the system
and track the Internet activities. The sophisticated hackers know about hiding their
tracks. This makes it difficult for systems to decide which IP addresses should be
blocked because it could affect many normal users.
There exist many methods that can hide the IP address [87]–[89]. First, Virtual
Private Network (VPN) provider can assign a new IP address to the system, and every
traffic from the system routes through the VPN network. This makes it possible to
hide the true IP address assigned by the ISP. Second, there are thousands of free web
proxy servers that the system can use to hide the true IP address and connects the
Internet anonymously by connecting the network through an intermediate “proxy”,
which relays the information back and forth between the system and the destination.
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When the VPN or the proxy server was blocked by the secure system, the other users
who connect the system through the VPN or the proxy server would be blocked
together no matter they were normal users or not. Thus, the secure systems need to be
cautious before blocking the suspicious IP addresses.

2.7 Summary
We provided the background and related scholar research work in this chapter.
Section 2.1 reviewed the types of IDS and presented the advantages and disadvantages
of ADS. Section 2.2 discussed the Statistical analysis-based ADS with the advantages
of the flow-based statistical analysis. The related graph theory for the flow-based
statistical analysis was presented in Section 2.3 and discussed how the theory can
characterize each network node’s behaviors. Section 2.4 provided the contextual
literature review of the trust management scheme that was used for representing the
results of each statistical analysis method, and Section 2.5 gave a background research
for an adaptive threshold. Section 2.6 presented the attacks that this dissertation aims
to detect with the statistical analysis-based ADS. Chapter 3 will present an ADS
(Section 2.1) that can detect network attacks (Section 2.6) with the flow-based
statistical analysis (Section 2.2) by characterizing each node’s behaviors (Section 2.3)
and representing the results with a trust management scheme (Section 2.4) in a
dynamic environment (Section 2.5).
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CHAPTER 3

STATISTICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS BY USING TRUST

This dissertation proposes a statistical network analysis method by using trust to
implement an effective IDS, especially an effective ADS. First of all, we reduced the
amount of dataset to be analyzed by representing the relationships between nodes with
graphs as we discussed in Section 2.3. Graph has been used by many research
proposals to implement relationship-based ADS [6], [37], [56], [59], [62], [63]. In
particular, Choi et al. [37] detected malicious behaviors by using parallel coordinate
graphs with degree analysis, and Ding et al. [6] showed that the nodes, which do not
respect community’s boundaries, can be classified as malicious nodes. However, it is
hard to understand the produced results of the statistical analyses in the two research
proposals without statistical background because each result has different meaning
depending on the analysis method. For the same reason, the results cannot be
integrated into one value. Moreover, a certain threshold is required for each analysis to
detect malicious behaviors, but it is difficult to decide an appropriate value in a
dynamic environment, such as the Internet, because a high threshold cannot detect
malicious nodes while a low threshold has a possibility that normal nodes would be
classified as malicious as we discussed in Section 2.5.
This chapter proposes an analysis method to achieve the goals of this dissertation
in Section 1.2. Section 3.1 discusses how we can characterize each node with
statistical analyses, and Section 3.2 proposes a method that represents the produced
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results using a trust management scheme. Section 3.3 presents how the Predictability
Trust (PRT) integrates multiple statistical analyses, and Section 3.4 shows how the
produced trust values can be integrated into one. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes
Chapter 3.

3.1 Node characterization
The parallel coordinates analysis method [37] showed that each scanning attack
has its own behavior signature as we discussed in Section 2.4. A hostscan attack node
shows high host-degree and low port-degree, a portscan attack node shows low hostdegree and high port-degree, and a hybrid-scan attack node shows high host-degree
and high port-degree. Therefore, we can characterize each node’s behaviors by
analyzing the degree information whether it is a scanning attack node or not.
Moreover, the clustering coefficient and betweenness centrality can be used for
characterizing the nodes that do not respect the community’s boundaries as shown in
[6]. Thus, this dissertation utilizes the host-degree, port-degree, clustering coefficient,
and betweenness centrality for characterizing each node’s behaviors from bipartite and
projection graphs.
There exist two issues we need to address to utilize the four factors. First, [37]
detected malicious nodes based on the high degree information, and [6] showed that
malicious nodes tend to show low clustering coefficient or high betweenness centrality
information. However, it is not clear that how big degree and betweenness centrality is
malicious and how small it is normal. It is also not clear how small clustering
coefficient is malicious and how big it is normal. Moreover, the Internet is a dynamic
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environment that changes every day, every hour, and every minute. Thus, we needed
to create an appropriate rule for detecting the malicious behaviors by considering the
overall behavior conditions. To solve this issue, we applied the outlier-based adaptive
threshold method to the degree and betweenness centrality information to detect
malicious behaviors that occur in low probability regions. We note that the outlierbased adaptive threshold method cannot be applied to the clustering coefficient
information because it does not show the heavy-tailed distribution as shown in Figure
14.

Figure 14. Clustering coefficient distribution for one day of data

Second, the degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality are
represented by simple numbers, and it is not intuitive what the numbers mean without
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the related statistical background. Besides, each information has different ranges of
numbers. For instance, the host-degree showed the range from 1 to 6,455, port-degree
showed the range from 1 to 14,186, clustering coefficient showed the range from 0 to
1, and the betweenness centrality showed the range from 0 to 109,171,143.80161 in
the European dataset. Thus, it is not possible to integrate the information into one
value. We present a trust management scheme as a solution to deal with these two
issues.

3.2 Modified Beta Reputation
Beta reputation was proposed by Jøsang et al. in [5], and we discussed this
technique in Section 2.4.2. The proposed Beta reputation predicts the future behaviors
of each node based on the past behaviors. We employed the Beta reputation; 1) to rate
each different ranges of behavior information between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable),
2) to provide a simple calculation method, 3) to provide accumulative evaluation
method, so reduce the amount of data to be analyzed, 4) to avoid erroneously labeling
nodes with a few malicious behaviors, and 5) to integrate multiple behavior
information into one.
In our Modified Beta Reputation method, we defined two thresholds to establish
appropriate standards for normal and malicious behavior. We define a Maximum
Threshold (MaxTh) as a certain value that identifies outliers. The Minimum Threshold
(MinTh) is defined as an average of the observed values except for the outliers.
Since the Beta reputation relies on a certain threshold to decide whether a
behavior met the expectation of a system or not (Section 2.4.2), we employed the
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adaptive threshold in Section 2.5 to deal with a dynamic environment, and the
threshold is called as MaxTh in this dissertation. At the same time, we set another
adaptive threshold to detect normal behaviors, which occur in high probability regions,
because the range of the collected information can be huge as shown in Section 3.1.
The average is the most popular and well-known measure of central tendency,
which is a single value that attempts to describe a set of data by identifying the central
position within that set of data [90]. However, the average has one main disadvantage:
it is particularly susceptible to the influence of outliers [90]. Since we computed the
outliers by using the adaptive threshold, we could overcome the disadvantage. Thus,
this research used the average of the behaviors except for the outliers, and the
threshold is called as MinTh in this dissertation.
We modified the trust management scheme to utilize the two adaptive thresholds
because the beta reputation uses only one threshold. Besides, the modified beta
reputation can show how the behavior, which is placed between the MinTh and
MaxTh, is closed to the normal behavior or malicious behavior.
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(11)

(12)

≔

(13)

≔

1

≔

(14)

2

,where each symbol represents the minimum threshold of the dataset (MinTh), the
maximum threshold of the dataset (MaxTh), Behavior Value of node i (

), Normal

Behavior Rate of node i (

), Number

), Malicious Behavior Rate of node i (

of Normal Behaviors of node i (
(

), Number of Malicious Behaviors of node i

), and Trust of node i ( ) respectively. The

includes host-degree, port-

degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality of node i that we discussed
in Section 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and 2.3.5, and we the calculated trust values to characterize
each node’s behaviors.
The outlier-based adaptive threshold technique (Section 2.5) was used for setting
the MaxTh values in (11) and (12), which decides whether the

was normal or

malicious. As we discussed in Section 2.5, the order of tests is from the maximum
value to the minimum value. This was applied to the host-degree, port-degree, and
betweenness centrality evaluations because the high value is worse than the low value
of each

. Thus, the X1,n is the maximum value and Xn,n is the minimum value in

the dataset of the BVs. The MinTh can be decided after removing the outliers from the
dataset.
By using the MinTh and MaxTh values, we can set the
is greater than the MaxTh, the

will be set to 0, and the
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and

. When
will be set to

1. On the contrary, if
and the

is smaller than the MinTh value, the

will be set to 1,

⁄

in

will be set to 0. The equation

(11) and (12) rates how close the

to the MinTh and MaxTh values. For instance, if

we set the MinTh to 5, MaxTh to 10, and BV to 6, the NBR and MBR of the node will
be

≔1

1
6 5
10 5

≔

6 5
10 5

.

.

Besides, this method made it possible that the inactivity of a node would not
affect the trust changes. Since the both NBR and MBR of the node would be 0s, the
both NBB and MBB will keep the same value.
As we note in Section 2.5, we did not apply the outlier-based adaptive threshold
method to the clustering coefficient because the clustering coefficient does not show
the heavy-tailed distribution as shown in Figure 10. Thus, we decided to set a static
threshold only for the clustering coefficient analyses. The static threshold will be
decided by comparing the detection efficiency of each threshold from 0 to 1 in the
European dataset and DShield list (Section 1.3), and the detailed statistical analysis
result is presented in Section 4.3.3.
The calculated

and

are accumulated over time to the

and

respectively by (13). The modified Beta reputation equation (14) computes the
trust value for each node by using the accumulated behaviors, which are the
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and

. This research maintains the
behaviors; host-degree (
betweenness centrality (

,

), port-degree (

, and trust values for each type of
), clustering coefficient (

), and

).

By employing the modified Beta reputation, we can convert the different ranges
of node characterization information between 0 and 1 that represent unreliable and
reliable respectively. Besides, the method provides a low time complexity. The
outlier-based adaptive threshold requires O
Merge Sort) [91] and O

log

for a sorting algorithm (i.e.

for the evaluation from the highest value to the lowest

value that we discussed in Section 2.5, where the n represents the number of unique
values. Also, the average-based adaptive threshold requires O

for the addition of

all the values with one division, and the Beta Reputation requires O

for the

thresholds comparisons with the trust calculations that was discussed in this section,
where the m represents the number of nodes. Thus, the total complexity of the
modified Beta reputation is O

log

O

. The accumulative evaluation feature

also saves the storage because this method requires the space complexity O

for

each trust type. Moreover, it provides a method to avoid erroneously labeling nodes
with a few malicious behaviors because only one malicious behavior does not lower
the trust value at once, and the successive normal behaviors can recover the trust.
Since the different rages of the node characterization information were converted into
a same range, it is also possible to integrate multiple characteristics into a single value,
so the integrated trust can efficiently find malicious nodes that attempt different types
of attacks alternatively as we discussed in Section 2.4.1.
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3.3 Predictability Trust
In addition to the types of trust in Section 3.2, this research employed
Predictability Trust (PRT) for ADS systems to evaluate a node with multiple statistical
characteristics and to provide defense against On-off attacks. First of all, an attack
node might attempt different attacks each day, so it would be difficult to detect the
attack node if each trust value works independently. The PRT is not only able to
consider a single type of behaviors but also a combination of multiple types depending
on the design of systems. In this dissertation, the PRT examined the host-degree, portdegree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality together to detect any type
of alternative hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, or any types of attacks that do not
respect the community’s boundaries. We also note that this research employed two
kinds of threshold as we discussed in Section 3.2, and we cannot be sure whether a
node is normal or malicious if the behavior is greater than the MinTh and smaller than
the MaxTh while it is clear the node is normal if the behavior is smaller than the
MinTh, and the node is malicious if the behavior is greater than then MaxTh. Thus, we
decided not to consider the unclear behaviors for the PRT, and they will not affect to
either the NPB or MPB.

1

≔

2

(15)

The PRT will be computed by (5), and the NPB and MPB will be set by the
following conditions. The pseudocode is shown in APPENDIX I.A.
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If all the behaviors placed between the MaxTh and MinTh, neither the NPB nor
MPB will be increased.



If any one of the behaviors exceeded the MaxTh, the MPB will be increased,
but not NPB.



If any one of the behaviors did not exceed the MinTh, and the other behaviors
did not exceed the MaxTh, the NPB will be increased, but not MPB.

Secondly, as we discussed in Section 2.4.3, the PRT provides a cautious
evaluation method that determines whether the behaviors of a node are unintentional
temporary errors or a part of On-off attacks. The PRT with Sliding windows (SW) is a
method that detects On-off attacks, which aim at disturbing trust management schemes
[66], [68]. As shown in the following examples, the Beta reputation, as well as the
modified Beta reputation, can be easily disturbed by an On-off attack. We evaluated
the Beta reputation with four different types of behavior patterns shown in Table 2.
Each T and F represent a normal and malicious behavior respectively.
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(d) Random
Table 2. The patterns of on-off attacks

The behavior type (a) assumes that a node showed a temporary error, and the
node can be classified as malicious with the only mistake as we discussed in Section
2.6.2. It may increase the false positive rate of an ADS, and our trust management
scheme can avoid this situation. The behavior type (b), (c), and (d) are the possible
4G-1B On-off attack patterns, and (c) and (d) were designed to recover the trust
enough and attempt other attacks on the system. The Beta reputation can be disturbed
by these types of behavior patterns due to the behavior-based redemption feature
(Section 2.4). Moreover, some random behavior patterns, such a pattern shown in
Table 2.(d), can also disturb the Beta reputation method.
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(a) One-time error

(b) Close-set attacks

(c) Evenly distributed On-off attacks

(d) Random On-off attacks

Figure 15. The changes of the Beta reputation depending on the behavior
patterns

Figure 15 shows the changes of the Beta reputation values depending on the
behavior patterns in Table 2. The X-axis and Y-axis represent the behavior number
and the corresponding trust value respectively. The Beta reputation recovered the trust
value in the one-time error type due to the behavior-based redemption feature and the
successive normal behaviors as shown in Figure 15.(a), and it showed that a node with
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one mistake does not have very low trust value as expect. On the other hand, close-set
attack type showed a very low trust value after the 10 malicious behaviors as shown in
Figure 15.(b), and it might be blocked if the system has a trust threshold 0.3. On the
other hand, Figure 15.(c) and (d) maintained high trust value, even they showed the
same number of malicious behaviors to the close-set type, and these cases showed the
vulnerability of the Beta reputation. The two pattern types could disturb the Beta
reputation with well distributed normal and malicious behaviors.
Calculating the PTR, (5) also requires the sizes for the Normal Behavior Window
(NBW) and Malicious Behavior Window (MBW). To show how the PRT provides a
defense against On-off attacks in Table 2, we set the size of the NBW to 5 that can
observe up to five previous behaviors, and the MBW has two sizes; the minimum size
was set to 5, and the maximum size was set to 50. These NBW and MBW combination
can detect up to 4N-1M On-off attacks [68].
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(a) One-time error

(b) Close-set attacks

(c) Evenly distributed On-off attacks

(d) Random On-off attacks

Figure 16. The changes of the PRT depending on the behavior patterns

The PRT showed similar results to the Beta reputation in Figure 16.(a) and (b). In
Figure 16.(a), it recovered the trust value for the one-time error type but slower than
the Beta reputation due to the one malicious behavior. The figure also showed that the
one malicious behavior does not much lower the trust value. Figure 16.(b) showed that
the many successive malicious behaviors lowers the trust similar to the Beta
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reputation. On the other hand, the PRT showed different changes for the evenly
distributed and random On-off attacks., and they showed how the PRT provided
defense against On-off attacks. The Beta reputation was disturbed by the alternative
normal-malicious behaviors while the PRT could successfully lower the trust values of
the On-off attack patterns as shown in Figure 16.(c) and (d). Since the PRT extends the
size of the dynamic sliding window depending on the current trust, it was able to
observe more number of malicious behaviors and lowered the trust values.
By employing the PRT, we were able to consider multiple node characterization
information together and provide defense against On-off attacks with low time and
space complexity. The PRT requires O
window size M of N nodes, and O
complexity of the PRT is O

for traveling the maximum sliding

for the trust calculation. Thus, the total time
. Besides, the sliding windows can save more

space if they were implemented in bit-wise operation because the PRT considers only
normal (TRUE) or malicious (FALSE). Thus, each sliding window for each node
requires

⁄8, and the space complexity of the PRT is O

.

3.4 Overall trust
We defined the Overall Trust (OT) value as a compilation of all of the other trust
values to evaluate if a node is malicious or not. The OT provides concise information
to a system or a human supervisor by considering overall characteristics of each node
and makes it possible to take appropriate actions based on the information. This
dissertation used the OT to integrate multiple trust values, including the
,

, and

,

,

, into one. There exist many other ways that can implement this
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type of trust. For example, Chae et al. proposed an OT that each trust has own weight
that can contribute to the OT in [68].

n

Overall Trust   Ti  Wi
i 1

n

 Wi  1

(16)

i 1

,where the

represents a type of Trust, and the

represents the weight of the Trust

in the Overall Trust. Other than this method, the average of the trust values, maximum
trust value, or minimum trust value can be used for implementing the OT. Among the
various methods, we decided to use the minimum trust value in this research to
quickly detect the malicious node.

3.5 Summary
Chapter 3 proposed a statistical analysis-based ADS. However, the results of the
statistical analysis are not intuitive and require statistical background to understand the
numbers. Moreover, it is not possible to integrate multiple behavior information into
one because each analysis method produces different ranges of numbers (Section 3.1).
This dissertation proposed a trust management scheme as a solution that can convert
each characteristic between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable), so a human supervisor can
understand the results without the related statistical background. The Beta reputation
(Section 2.4.2) was modified for creating appropriate rules for decision-making about
network node behaviors in a dynamic network environment by using an adaptive
threshold (Section 2.5), and the modified Beta reputation was proposed in Section 3.2.
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Besides, the trust makes it possible to integrate multiple behavior information into one
because they will be presented in the same ranges. We used two methods to integrate
the trust values. The Predictability trust was used for detecting malicious behavior
patterns across the characteristics (Section 3.3), and the Overall trust represents
multiple trust values in one single number (Section 3.4). In next chapter, we will show
how much the graph can reduce the network flows, how well the trust management
scheme represents the statistical analysis, and how well the proposed ADS detects
malicious behaviors.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Chapter 4 evaluates the efficiency of the proposed graph-based representation,
trust management scheme, and adaptive threshold methods, and how the methods
achieved the goals stated in Chapter 1 by using the European dataset, DShield Logs,
and URI dataset. Section 4.1 shows how much the graph-based representation reduced
the datasets to be statistically analyzed. Section 4.2 describes how the trust
management can represent the results of the statistical analysis appropriately, and
Section 4.3 shows the effectiveness of the adaptive threshold by comparing a few
static thresholds. This dissertation presents the detection results of the scanning attacks
in the European dataset and URI datasets by using the proposed methods in Section
4.4. Section 4.5 shows how the trust management scheme works in a few special
cases. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes this chapter.

4.1 Graph-based representation of network flows
This section shows the amount of data that can be reduced by using graph-based
presentation. As discussed in Section 3.2, one of the advantages of using graph-based
analysis is that the proposed methods can reduce the amount of dataset to be analyzed
because many duplicate relationships between two nodes can be presented as one edge
in a graph (Section 2.2.2).
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For instance,
Source node

Destination node

…
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
…

…
1.1.1.2
1.1.1.3
1.1.1.3
1.1.1.3
1.1.1.4
…

can be reduced by the graph presentation like the following.

Source node

Destination node

…
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1
…

…
1.1.1.2
1.1.1.3
1.1.1.4
…

In a large dataset, this method can reduce a huge amount of data by removing
duplicate relationships and can save the processing and storage resources required for
statistical analysis. Since this dissertation mainly focuses on detecting three types of
scanning attacks (Section 2.6.1) and the nodes that do not respect community
boundaries (Section 2.3.4, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5), we used the parts of network flows that
are not compressed, encrypted, or fragmented, namely the IP address and port
numbers. The following figures show how much the graph representation can reduce
the datasets.
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Figure 17. Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between
the original and graph represented in the European dataset

Figure 18. Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the
original and graph represented in the European dataset
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Figure 19. Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between
the original and graph represented in the URI dataset

Figure 20. Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the
original and graph represented in the URI dataset
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Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the amount of reduced data to be analyzed when
the graph representation is applied to the European dataset. By using graphs the
original network flow datasets were reduced by at least 81.1% and up to 86.9% for the
IP address (Figure 17) and at least 77.9% and up to 80.8% for the ports (Figure 18).
The detailed comparisons are described in APPENDIX II.A. Additionally. Figure 19
and Figure 20 show the amount of reduced data to be analyzed for the URI dataset.
We could reduce the original URI network flow dataset by at least 31.1% and up to
54.3% for the IP addresses and at least 63.6% and up to 85.3% for the port. The
detailed numbers are described in APPENDIX II.B.

4.2 Relationship between statistical analysis and trust management scheme
Since malicious behaviors could have been caused by unintentional temporary
errors or by attackers who have used fake identification (Section 2.6.2), this
dissertation is more interested in the patterns of the malicious behaviors rather than
each malicious behavior of the nodes in a system. Moreover, it is difficult to be sure
that a node is an attacker by observing a few malicious behaviors. Thus, monitoring
systems need to be cautious before blocking a node from accessing the systems
because many normal users can be affected, which is called False Positive. In this
work, we employed a trust management scheme to quantify the patterns, and we will
show how well the trust management scheme can represent the patterns of the
malicious behaviors in this section.
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4.1.1 Experiment design
In what follows, we analyzed the host-degree of the European datasets (Section
1.3) that have been used for community-based statistical analysis in [6]. The authors
mentioned that the malicious sources often send traffic to many other nodes, and so
candidates for detection are with high host-degree. Therefore, this experiment focuses
on the host-degree analysis and shows how the trust management scheme can
represent the degree-based analysis method over time. We label a node as malicious if
any node shows higher host-degree than a critical threshold. The threshold values are
used for creating ROC curves that can show the efficiency of each detection method.
This experiment compares the efficiency of different behavior patterns to the trust
management scheme by using the ROC curves and the corresponding AUCs.

4.1.1.1 Degree-based pattern analysis methods
Here, we apply three possible accumulative over time patterns of malicious
behaviors: Everyday, Average Degree, and At Least Once.


Everyday: Node is labeled as malicious if the node showed higher host-degrees
than the threshold every day. The procedures are shown in APPENDIX I.B.



Average Degree: Node is labeled as malicious if the average host-degrees of
the nodes during the 14 days is greater than the threshold. The procedures are
shown in APPENDIX I.C.



At Least Once: Node is labeled as malicious if the node showed higher hostdegrees than the threshold at least once during the 14 days. The procedures are
shown in APPENDIX I.D.
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It is worth noting that the At Least Once method is the most stringent, the
Everyday method is the least stringent, and the Average Degree method is a
moderately stringent monitoring strategy.
The ROC curves for each pattern were created by using the pseudocodes in
APPENDIX I.B, C, D based on the above conditions with the host-degree thresholds
from 1 (the minimum host-degree during the 14 days) to 6455 (the maximum hostdegree during the 14 days). Each day, we classified a node as malicious, if a node
showed a higher host-degree than the host-degree threshold. After 14 days, we
classified a node as malicious if a node was malicious everyday according to Everyday
accumulation pattern, or at least once during 14 days according to At Least Once
pattern, or if its average host-degree was above average according to Average Degree
pattern. After classifying each node as malicious or not with the specified method, we
determined if the node was present in the DShield Logs to compute the TPR, FPR, and
ROC curves. Please note that the DShield Logs are not a perfect representation of all
malicious nodes, and our methods can only detect the malicious behaviors based on
host-degree information, such as hostscan or a hybrid-scan (Section 2.6.1). Therefore,
the ROC curves cannot represent the absolute efficiency of each method but can be
used for comparing the efficiency of different methods.
We computed each ROC curve by checking that the detected malicious nodes
based on the three methods are present in the DShield Logs or not. When a detected
malicious node is in the DShield Logs, it increases the number of True Positives (TP)
by one while if the node is not on the DShield Logs, it increases the number of False
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Positives (FP) by one. When a node is in the DShield Logs but is not classified as a
malicious node, it increases the number of False Negative (FN) by one while if the
node is not listed in the DShield Logs, it increases the number of True Negative (TN)
by one. The True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) are computed
using (17) and (18).

(17)
(18)

The TPR and FPR computed for each host-degree threshold are used for creating a
ROC curve. Each ROC curve is used for computing the corresponding Area Under a
ROC Curve (AUC) that is a common evaluation metric for binary classification
problems. If the classifier is accurate enough , the TPR increases quickly and the
AUC is close to 1.

4.1.1.2 Trust-based pattern analysis method
In this section, we describe how the ROC curves are produced for Trust-based
detection method. Specifically, we use the following equations that are based on the
Beta reputation [5] that were described in Section 2.4.2. For each day over the 14 days
period, we compute the host degree of each node. If a node shows behavior with the
host-degree higher than the host-degree threshold, we classify the node’s behavior as
negative. Otherwise we classify its behavior as positive. The rate of positive behaviors
and the rate of negative behaviors for each node we accumulated over the 14 days.
The accumulated values were used to calculate the trust values for each node.
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≔

≔

1

1 , Behavior

Degree t

0 , Behavior

Degree t

1 , Behavior

Degree t

(19)

1

(20)
0 , Behavior

Degree t

1

≔

(21)

2

In Equations (19), (20), and (21), t represents the number of days over which the trust
is accumulated,

represents the trust value of node i,

positive behaviors of node i, and

represents the number of

represents the number of negative behaviors of

node i. The detailed procedures are shown in APPENDIX I.E.
The trust values calculated using Equations (19), (20), and (21) with host-degree
thresholds from 1 (the minimum host-degree during the 14 days) to 6455 (the
maximum host-degree during the 14 days), were utilized to produce the ROC curves.
In order to create the ROC curve, we had to define a way to use trust to determine if a
node is malicious. To do this, we considered the trust value after day 14 and selected
a trust value under which we would label the node as malicious, the trust threshold.
We constructed nine different ROC curves using trust thresholds ranging from 0.1 to
0.9 with 0.1 intervals. We then compare the detected malicious nodes based on the
trust to the DShield Logs and compute the corresponding TP, FP, FN, and TN. These
numbers are used for computing each True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive
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Rate (FPR) by using (17) and (18), and to create the ROC curves and the
corresponding AUCs depending on each trust threshold.

4.1.2 Experimental results
Figure 21 shows the ROC curves for three simple accumulative methods (i.e.,
Everyday, Average Degree, and At Least Once) and the trust-based method. Among
the three malicious patterns, the At Least Once method showed the highest detection
efficiency, and it means that the method showed the detection efficiency close to the
DShield Logs. In other words, the DShield Logs also classified the malicious nodes
with one or a few behaviors. However, there is a possibility that the malicious
behaviors have been caused by unintentional temporary error or an attacker has used a
fake identification, so ADSs should not classify a malicious node with a few malicious
behaviors as we discussed in Section 2.6.2. In other words, detecting a malicious node
with a few malicious behaviors cannot be the best practice in an ADS because it
increases False Positive, which is one of the disadvantages of the ADSs.
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Figure 21. Relationships between the degree-based analysis and trust-based
analysis.

One interesting observation we made was that two lines in each analysis were
overlapped, which are the Everyday malicious and trust threshold 0.1 pairs and the At
Least Once malicious and trust threshold 0.9 pairs. Moreover, the trust threshold 0.7
showed very similar line to the Average Degree malicious. We explain these results
below.


Everyday and 0.1 pairs: If a node showed malicious behaviors every day
during
0

the

1 ⁄ 0

14
14

days,
2

the

trust

1 ⁄ 1

13

2

the

node

would

be

0.0625 . If the node showed only one normal

behavior during the 14 days, the
1

of

trust of the node would be

0.125. Thus, when we set the trust threshold to 0.1,

every node that showed malicious behaviors every day during the 14 days will
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be classified as malicious. This is why these two graphs showed the identical
results.


At Least Once and 0.9 pairs: If a node showed normal behaviors every day
during
14

the
1 ⁄ 14

14
0

days,
2

the

node

would

have

its

trust

value

0.9375 while if the node showed only one

malicious behavior during the 14 days, the trust value would be
13

1 ⁄ 13

1

2

0.875. Thus, when we set the trust threshold to 0.9,

every node that showed malicious behavior at least once during the 14 days
will be classified as malicious. Therefore, these two graphs showed the same
results.

From the Everyday and 0.1 pairs and the At Least Once and 0.9 pairs, we can
deduce following equation that decides the corresponding trust threshold.

1
2

, where the trust threshold

(22)

can represent the behavior pattern with at least k

malicious behaviors over d days. These results showed we can represent the Everyday
and At Least Once accumulative methods with the trust method simply by changing
the trust threshold. More generally, the trust-based analysis can provide flexibility for
system designers who can vary of strictness of the monitoring system by choosing the
trust thresholds.
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4.3 Static and adaptive thresholds
In Section 4.2 we have shown that the trust management scheme can be used to
represent various malicious patterns of behavior and provide a flexible design for the
system designers. The trust management scheme depends on a threshold that is used to
evaluate a behavior and to determine whether it is normal (reliable) or malicious
(unreliable). In this section, we present the modified trust calculation, which we
proposed in Section 3.2, and demonstrate that using an adaptive threshold is more
efficient than using static thresholds in a dynamic environment.

4.3.1 Experiment design
In what follows, we compare the use of the adaptive threshold to five different
static thresholds with ROC curves and AUCs. We chose a constant value of 2 for the
first static threshold and show that if the threshold is too low, the rate of false positive
can be excessive. Other three values of the thresholds are determined based on the
average, which is the most popular and well-known measure of central tendency [90];
the average degree of all the nodes, average degree of the nodes that are not listed in
the DShield Logs, and the average degree of the nodes that were listed in the DShield
Logs. The last static threshold was determined based on the True Positive Rate (TPR)
of the ROC curves during the 14 days. We analyzed the ROC curves and chose the
value that ensured above 70% TPR over the 14 days.
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4.3.1.1 Static thresholds for the host-degree analysis
Day

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Not In 7.28

6.82

6.92

7.14

8.91

8.83

6.22

6.23

In

120.61 132.07 121.28 129.7

121.83 108.95 108.67 127.61

All

8.55

8.32

8.23

8.53

10.96

10.65

Day

9

10

11

12

13

14

Not In 6.48

6.71

6.79

9.14

9.08

6.35

7.53

Average
≈ 7.35

In

128.9

149.1

150.33 118.87 145.67 211.06 ≈ 133.9

All

7.94

8.2

8.27

11.02

11.13

7.79

7.64

≈ 8.91

Table 3. Average host-degree on each day

Table 3 shows the average host-degrees on each day and the average host-degrees
over the 14 days for each category (i.e., All nodes, nodes In DShield list, nodes Not In
DShield list). From the results above, we determined three static thresholds: 7 - the
average host-degree of the nodes not listed in the DShield Logs; 9 - the average hostdegree of all nodes, and 134 - the average host-degrees of the nodes listed in the
DShield Logs. Since a host-degree is a number of connections, we have rounded the
averages in Table 3. The static threshold of 134 is used to illustrate the risk of
choosing a threshold that is too high. In this case, the detection rate is low., We have
observes that the malicious sources often send traffic to many other nodes and hence
have a high out-degree.
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Threshold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…

Day-1

1

0.95

0.91

0.85

0.78

0.72

0.67

…

Day-2

1

0.93

0.89

0.84

0.79

0.75

0.71

…

Day-3

1

0.95

0.9

0.86

0.84

0.79

0.75

…

Day-4

1

0.93

0.89

0.84

0.79

0.76

0.71

…

Day-5

1

0.94

0.87

0.8

0.77

0.74

0.69

…

Day-6

1

0.93

0.88

0.85

0.79

0.74

0.69

…

Day-7

1

0.95

0.88

0.8

0.73

0.67

0.65

…

Day-8

1

0.93

0.87

0.81

0.77

0.73

0.69

…

Day-9

1

0.94

0.89

0.83

0.77

0.7

0.67

…

Day-10

1

0.93

0.83

0.79

0.74

0.67

0.64

…

Day-11

1

0.92

0.86

0.81

0.75

0.72

0.69

…

Day-12

1

0.95

0.88

0.82

0.76

0.73

0.67

…

Day-13

1

0.92

0.85

0.79

0.74

0.7

0.66

…

Day-14

1

0.94

0.9

0.86

0.83

0.79

0.76

…

Table 4. TPR of the host-degree based analysis on each degree threshold
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Threshold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…

Day-1

1

0.5

0.34

0.25

0.21

0.18

0.15

…

Day-2

1

0.5

0.32

0.24

0.19

0.16

0.14

…

Day-3

1

0.5

0.33

0.25

0.2

0.17

0.14

…

Day-4

1

0.5

0.33

0.25

0.2

0.17

0.15

…

Day-5

1

0.57

0.41

0.32

0.27

0.23

0.21

…

Day-6

1

0.56

0.4

0.31

0.26

0.22

0.19

…

Day-7

1

0.49

0.32

0.24

0.19

0.16

0.13

…

Day-8

1

0.49

0.32

0.23

0.18

0.16

0.13

…

Day-9

1

0.49

0.32

0.24

0.19

0.16

0.14

…

Day-10

1

0.49

0.32

0.24

0.19

0.16

0.14

…

Day-11

1

0.5

0.33

0.24

0.2

0.17

0.15

…

Day-12

1

0.56

0.41

0.32

0.27

0.23

0.2

…

Day-13

1

0.57

0.4

0.31

0.26

0.22

0.19

…

Day-14

1

0.49

0.31

0.24

0.19

0.16

0.14

…

Table 5. FPR of the host-degree based analysis on each degree threshold

By analyzing the ROC curves over the 14 days, we select another static threshold.
Based on the TPR and FPR calculated using the host-degree threshold from 1 to 6455
and summarized in Table 4 and Table 5, we choose the host-degree threshold of 5 that
ensured the TPR above 70% over the 14 days. The shaded part of Table 4 shows that
the TPR was at least 73% while the FPR was at best 26% during the 14 days as shown
in the shaded part of Table 5.
In conclusion, we chose the five static thresholds for the host-degree based
analysis; 7, 9, and 134 based on the averages, 5 based on the TPR analysis, and a
constant threshold of 2.
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4.3.1.2 Static thresholds for the port-degree analysis
Day

1

Not In 10.82

2
10.88

3

4

10.84 11.5

5

6

7

8

16.59

16.42

10.4

9.65

In

125.67 129.11 115.2 125.54 121.88 122.17 98.27 108.5

All

12.1

Day

9

Not In 9.71

12.29
10
10.21

12.04 12.8
11

10.72 16.37

In

113.85 133.78 126

All

10.95

11.51

12

18.5
13
15.28

101.97 127.9

11.91 17.84

16.97

18.35

11.52 10.8

14

Average

9.34

≈ 12.05

209.59 ≈ 125.67
10.76

≈ 13.45

Table 6. Average port-degree on each day

Table 6 shows the average port-degrees on each day and the average port-degrees
over the 14 days for each category of nodes category (All nodes, nodes In DShield list,
nodes Not In DShield list). From these results, we determine three static thresholds
similarly to Section 4.3.1.1. Specifically, we fix threshold values at 12, 13, and 126,
the average port-degree of the nodes not listed in the DShield Logs, the average portdegree of all the nodes, and the average port-degree of the nodes listed in the DShield
Logs respectively. Since a port-degree is a number of, we rounded the averages. The
static threshold 126 was also selected to illustrate the risk risk of choosing a threshold
that is too high.
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Threshold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…

Day-1

1

0.94

0.89

0.82

0.77

0.71

0.67

…

Day-2

1

0.91

0.87

0.82

0.78

0.75

0.71

…

Day-3

1

0.94

0.88

0.84

0.82

0.79

0.75

…

Day-4

1

0.92

0.88

0.83

0.79

0.76

0.73

…

Day-5

1

0.93

0.85

0.78

0.75

0.71

0.68

…

Day-6

1

0.93

0.87

0.83

0.78

0.72

0.69

…

Day-7

1

0.93

0.87

0.79

0.73

0.68

0.65

…

Day-8

1

0.91

0.86

0.81

0.76

0.73

0.69

…

Day-9

1

0.93

0.87

0.81

0.75

0.69

0.66

…

Day-10

1

0.92

0.84

0.79

0.74

0.67

0.64

…

Day-11

1

0.91

0.85

0.82

0.75

0.71

0.69

…

Day-12

1

0.94

0.87

0.81

0.77

0.73

0.67

…

Day-13

1

0.92

0.85

0.78

0.74

0.7

0.68

…

Day-14

1

0.92

0.88

0.83

0.79

0.76

0.73

…

Table 7. TPR of the port-degree based analysis on each degree threshold
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Threshold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

…

Day-1

1

0.4

0.29

0.24

0.2

0.18

0.16

…

Day-2

1

0.39

0.27

0.22

0.19

0.17

0.16

…

Day-3

1

0.38

0.27

0.22

0.19

0.17

0.15

…

Day-4

1

0.38

0.27

0.22

0.19

0.17

0.15

…

Day-5

1

0.51

0.38

0.32

0.27

0.24

0.22

…

Day-6

1

0.52

0.39

0.32

0.28

0.25

0.22

…

Day-7

1

0.38

0.27

0.22

0.19

0.16

0.15

…

Day-8

1

0.37

0.26

0.2

0.17

0.15

0.14

…

Day-9

1

0.37

0.26

0.21

0.18

0.15

0.14

…

Day-10

1

0.37

0.26

0.21

0.18

0.16

0.14

…

Day-11

1

0.38

0.27

0.22

0.18

0.16

0.15

…

Day-12

1

0.5

0.37

0.31

0.27

0.24

0.21

…

Day-13

1

0.51

0.37

0.31

0.26

0.23

0.21

…

Day-14

1

0.36

0.25

0.2

0.17

0.15

0.14

…

Table 8. FPR of the port-degree based analysis on each degree threshold

Another static threshold has been chosen by analyzing the ROC curves during the
14 days. The TPR and FPR have been calculated using the port-degree threshold from
1 (the minimum port-degree during the 14 days) to 14186 (the maximum port-degree
during the 14 days) and summarized in Table 7 and Table 8. Since the port-degree
threshold 5 ensures above 70% TPR over the 14 days, we select the last static
threshold as 5. The shaded part of Table 7 shows that the TPR is at least 73% while
the FPR is at best 28% during the 14 days.
Thus, we select the five static thresholds for the host-degree based analysis; 2,
5,12, 13, and 126.
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4.3.1.3 Adaptive thresholds for the host-degree and port-degree

Figure 22. European dataset log-scaled host-degree histogram

Figure 22 shows the host-degree distribution inferred the European network flows,
and it clearly displays heavy-tailed distribution. Thus, it is reasonable to apply the
outlier-based adaptive threshold method introduced in Section 2.5. We calculate the
maximum and minimum thresholds for the trust calculation using Equations (8), (9),
and (10) by setting up

0.05 and κ

⁄4 respectively. The

detailed procedures are described in APPENDIX I.F. The minimum outlier of the
host-degree distribution is set to the MaxTh. The MinTh is computed as the average of
the host-degrees without the outliers (Section 3.2).
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4.3.1.4 ROC curves and AUC
In what follows, we produce the ROC curves and the corresponding AUCs for
each selected threshold and compare the efficiency of the malicious node detection
algorithms using the adaptive threshold versus using the fixed (static) thresholds. We
use the Beta reputation, introduced in Section 2.4.2, to calculate the trust values for the
static thresholds and we use the modified Beta reputation, proposed in Section 3.2, for
the adaptive threshold method. The latter method incorporates two thresholds, MinTh
and MaxTh. Since this experiment is designed for comparing the efficiency of the
adaptive threshold to the static threshold, we minimize the influence of the trust
management scheme by not accumulating the trust values over the 14 days, but detect
the malicious nodes based on the trust value daily.

1 ,

(23)

≔
0 ,
1 ,
≔

(24)
0 ,

≔

1
2

(25)

The trust values of each node for the static thresholds (Section 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2)
were calculated by using Equations (23), (24), and (25) with each threshold. The
Normal Behavior Rate of node i (

) is set to 1 if the Behavior (BV) of node i does

not exceed the static threshold while the Malicious Behavior Rate of node i (
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) is

set to 1 if the BV of node i exceeds the threshold. The Trust of node i ( ) is calculated
by using the

and

≔

≔

.

1

,

0

,

1

,

1

,

0

,

(26)

(27)

,
1

≔

(28)

2

The trust values of each node for the adaptive threshold (Section 4.3.1.3) were
calculated by using (26), (27), and (28). The

is set to 1 if the BV of node i is less
is set to 1 if the BV of node i

than or equal to the minimum threshold while the

is greater than or equal to the maximum threshold. When the BV of node i is placed
between the two thresholds, the

and

will be set by the equations in (26)

and (27). The Trust of node i ( ) is computed using the

and

.

The calculated trust values for each threshold were evaluated and compared by
using ROC curves and the corresponding AUCs. The TPR and FPR for the ROC
curves were calculated with the trust threshold from 0.0 to 1.0 with 0.001 intervals.

87

4.3.2 Experimental results
In this section, we present the results of 2 days out of 14 days because they showed
very similar results. The host-degree and port-degree were analyzed separately, and
the ROC curves and AUC were used for the comparisons.

Figure 23. Host-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold and
the adaptive threshold on Day 1
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Figure 24. Host-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold and
the adaptive threshold on Day 14

Figure 25. Host-degree analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Line plots)
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Figure 26. Host-degree analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Box plots)
TPR

FPR

Static-2

0.948171 0.504942

Static-5

0.783537 0.207009

Static-7

0.670732 0.154375

Static-9

0.615854 0.12538

Static-134 0.167683 0.00743
Adaptive

0.783537 0.207009

Table 9. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in the
Host-degree analysis on Day 1
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TPR

FPR

Static-2

0.942568 0.486698

Static-5

0.827703 0.187601

Static-7

0.756757 0.137017

Static-9

0.699324 0.109715

Static-134 0.260135 0.006452
Adaptive

0.858108 0.235536

Table 10. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in
the Host-degree analysis on Day 14
In Figure 23 and Figure 24, the results of the host-degree analysis are presented.
Each ROC curve represents the efficiency of each threshold, and the points of the
highest TPR and the corresponding FPR are presented in Table 9 and Table 10. The
AUCs rank high in the order of using adaptive, static 5, static 7, static 9, static 2, and
static 134 host-degree thresholds.
The results clearly show the risks of selecting the degree threshold which is too
low or too high. The static threshold 2 results in the highest TPR while it also shows
the highest FPR during the 14 days, implying that many normal nodes can be labeled
as malicious by the security system that employes the low host-degree threshold. On
the other hand, the static threshold 134 results in the lowest TPR and the lowest FPR
during the 14 days, implying that only a small number of normal nodes can be labeled
as malicious, but also many malicious nodes can be misclassified as normal, adversely
affecting the system.
The static threshold of 5, which was the best choice among the static threshold
deduced from the host-degree threshold-based analysis (Section 4.3.1.1), results in
relatively stable results. The TPR is greater than for other static thresholds but the
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static threshold of 2, and the FPR is much lower than the static threshold of 2. We
observed that in general the TPR increases and the FPR decreases for higher static
threshold values (see in Table 9 and Table 10).
The results obtained for the adaptive threshold are similar to the results of using
the static threshold of 5 in terms of the TPR and the FPR on the first day and a bit
better on the last day, and much better for other values of static thresholds for all days
(see Figure 25 and Figure 26). The detailed TPRs and FPRs are listed in APPENDIX
II.C.

Figure 27. Port-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold
and the adaptive threshold on Day 1

92

Figure 28. Port-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold
and the adaptive threshold on Day 14

Figure 29. Port-degree analysis and the the AUC during the 14 days (Line
plots)
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Figure 30. Port-degree analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Box plots)
TPR

FPR

Static-2

0.935976 0.40396

Static-5

0.77439

Static-12

0.557927 0.111695

Static-13

0.542683 0.10423

0.202861

Static-126 0.140244 0.01296
Adaptive

0.77439

0.202861

Table 11. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in
the Port-degree analysis on Day 1
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TPR

FPR

Static-2

0.918919 0.364921

Static-5

0.790541 0.173059

Static-12

0.614865 0.0938

Static-13

0.594595 0.088407

Static-126 0.236486 0.010931
Adaptive

0.790541 0.173059

Table 12. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in
the Port-degree analysis on Day 14
The ROC curves for the port-degree analysis are presented in Figure 27 and Figure
28. The results are similar to the host-degree analysis; the adaptive threshold-based
method is the most accurate, and the static threshold-based detection accuracy ranks in
the order of threshold values of 5, 12, 13, 2, and 126. However, the host-degree
analysis resulted in slightly better performance than the port-degree analysis.
Again, the results support the risks of choosing the threshold that is too low or too
high. The static threshold of 2 shows the highest TPR with the highest FPR, thereby
misclassifying many normal nodes as malicious. On the other hand, the static
threshold of 126 resuts in the lowest TPR and the lowest FPR during the 14 days,
thereby misclassifying many malicious nodes as normal.
The static threshold 5, which was the best choice of the static threshold deduced
from the port-degree threshold-based analysis (Section 4.3.1.2), shows the competitive
TPR and FPR compared to the other static thresholds. The relationships between the
threshold, TPR, and FPR in the port-degree analysis is similar to the one observed for
the host-degree analysis. The adaptive threshold-based method shows the best
detection performance resulting in higher AUCs during the 14 days than the other
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static thresholds (see Figure 29 and Figure 30.). The detailed TPR and FPR of the
intersections are listed in APPENDIX II.D.
In conclusion, in this section we show that the trust management scheme with the
adaptive threshold provides the superior detection performance compared to the trust
management scheme with the static thresholds.

4.3.3 Static threshold for clustering coefficient
As we discussed in Section 2.5, the clustering coefficient does not follow the
heavy-tailed distribution, so we cannot apply the adaptive threshold method for this
analysis, and needed to set a static threshold. To find the best static threshold, we
composed the same experiments described in Section 4.3.2.

Figure 31. Clustering coefficient analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Line
plots)
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Figure 32. Clustering coefficient analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Line
plots)
Figure 31 and Figure 32 show that the results of the clustering coefficient-based
malicious node detection. Each ROC curve represents the efficiency of each threshold.
We have tested the static thresholds every 0.05 from 0.05 to 1.0. As shown in the
figures, the AUC increases as the static threshold increased. Among the static
threshold candidates, we select the 0.95 for the static threshold of clustering
coefficients for further experiments.

4.4 Detecting attacks using trust management scheme
In previous sections, we showed that the trust management scheme could be used
to accumulate node behaviors over time (Section 4.2), and in combination with the
proposed adaptive threshold selection could provide superior detection performance
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compared to static threshold selection (Section 4.3). In this Section, we analyze the
European and URI datasets (Section 1.3) by using the trust management scheme,
which includes the modified Beta reputation with the proposed adaptive threshold
(Section 3.2), Predictability trust (Section 3.3), and Overall trust (Section 3.4).
This section focuses on three main analyses:


Daily malicious behavior analysis: We have analyzed four different types of
behaviors on each day using graph-based characteristics including: the hostdegree, port-degree, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient
discussed in Section 2.3. We evaluate the node behaviors using the adaptive
thresholds (Section 2.5 and 3.2), and the modified Beta reputation for the hostdegree, port-degree, and betweenness centrality, characteristics that follow
heavy-taild distribution. We evaluate the node behaviors using the clustering
coefficient with a static threshold 0.95 since it does not follow the heavy-tailed
distribution as discussed in Section 4.3.



Multi-day malicious behavior analysis: The main purpose of this analysis is
to identify the persistent malicious nodes. Each node in a network is identified
by an IP address, and the daily malicious behavior analysis is performed based
on the IP address. However, there exist many methods in which an attacker can
hide or change their IP addresses (Section 2.6.2). Thus, it could be dangerous
classifying a malicious node with a few behaviors because it would affect the
normal user who has used or will use the IP address. This dissertation claims
that an ADS needs to be cautious to evaluate a node and should not classify a
malicious node with a few malicious behaviors. It would be ideal if a secure
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system could store and observe the entire behaviors of each node and analyze
them, but it is unattainable due to the limited storage and processor speed.
Therefore, we employ the modified Beta reputation that provides a cumulative
behavior evaluation method (Section 3.2) and observe each node for several
days. The trust values are used for detecting the malicious nodes that show
several malicious behaviors over the observation period.


Aggregation of multiple trust values: An attacker may perform more than
one type of attack over the observation period. It would be difficult to detect a
malicious node by analyzing only one of the behaviors if an attacker performed
hostscan on the first observation day, portscan on the second day, and any
other types of attacks on the following days. Thus, it is important for security
systems to have an ability to aggregate the results of multiple analyses into one
to detect such an attacker. This research proposed two different trust values for
the aggregation of multiple trust values; the predictability trust (Section 3.3)
and the overall trust (Section 3.4). Since each behavior may affect the
calculation of the predictability trust as shown in Section 3.3, it can reflect the
behavior pattern of the node. Also, we present four different types of
aggregation method in Section 3.4 that can be implemented in other methods.

4.4.1

Experiment design

This dissertation focus is on the analyses the European and URI datasets and
detection of the hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, and any types of attacks that do not
respect the community boundaries by using the proposed methods in Chapter 3. The
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reasons we focus on these two datasets are the following: 1) the European dataset
contains the ground truth in a form of DShield Logs that can be used for validation,
however 2) the European dataset is limited to 14-days of network flows and contains
no node attributes, 3) the URI dataset contains 90-days of network flows with nodes
that can be classified as URI clients, URI servers, and non-URI nodes, but it does not
have a ground truth for evaluation.

4.4.1.1 Settings for the Predictability trust and Overall trust
As discussed in Section 2.4.3, the predictability trust was developed for detecting
On-off patterns. Since there is a possibility that an attacker performs the hostscan,
portscan, and the other types of attacks alternatively, the attacker may disturb the trust
management schemes. We consider and integrate the trust of the host-degree, portdegree, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient for the predictability trust.
However, we do not consider the behaviors when nodes are labeled as suspicious,
having node characteristics between the MaxTh and MinTh. The pseudocode is shown
in APPENDIX I.A. If one of the characteristics exceeds the MaxTh, we increase the
MPB while all characteristics need to be lower than the MinTh to increase the NPB.
By using the obtained NPB and MPB, we calculate the predictability trust values for
each node with (5).
The predictability trust requires two more parameters, which are a minimum
window size and a maximum window size, for the sliding windows. We set the
parameters to 5 and 72 for the minimum and maximum window sizes, respectively.
The parameters make the sliding windows for the Predictability Trust big enough to
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detect up to 5N-1M On-off attacks [68]. The window size of the dynamic sliding
windows can be calculated by equation (29). Thus, the dynamic sliding window can
change the observation size depending on the current trust.

≔

, where the

67

(29)

represents the current overall trust value of node i.

When a node is unreliable (
reliable (

72

0.0), the size will be 72 while the node is fully

1.0 ), the size will be 5. If the node is suspicious (

0.5 ), the

observation size will be 39. However, we need a large dataset to fully test the
predictability trust because the European dataset has only 14 days. The dataset would
never fill the dynamic sliding windows when it requires the maximum size
observation, and we would not be able to observe long-term redemption, which allows
a second chance to a malicious node based on a long-term observation.
The overall trust is defined to integrate the various trust values into one to quickly
detect malicious behaviors of each node. There are many ways that one can implement
the overall trust, such as an average of all the trust values, maximum trust value, or
minimum value as discussed in Section 3.4. We use the minimum value method in this
research for the quick detection of a malicious node. If any of the characteristics
exhibit a malicious behavior, it will be directly projected to the overall trust.
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4.4.1.2 European dataset analysis scenario
The European dataset has been analyzed through several steps as shown in Figure
33. In this section, we describe each step from the data collection to evaluation.

Figure 33. Data Analysis Scenario of the European dataset

A. Collect raw data: As described in Section 1.3, the dataset has been collected by
European Internet Service Provider in 2007 for 14 days, and it was sampled
1:1000. The dataset was collected with DShield Logs that contain the IP addresses
of malicious nodes.
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B. Infer node characteristics from the network flows: In graph theory, the degree
represents the number of edges from the vertex and to the vertex. In network
analysis, it shows the number of connections from a source node to the destination
nodes. This can be very valuable information that could indicate that a source node
is an attacker or that a destination node has been attacked by an adversary that
usually shows high degrees (i.e. DDoS, probing, and etc.) [6], [58]. In this
dissertation, we used the host-degrees, port-degrees, betweenness centrality, and
clustering coefficient to evaluate the behaviors of each node (Section 2.3). This
stage infers node characteristic information from the European network flows
datasets. The most intuitive way to identify super spreaders or attack nodes, such
as hostscan or portscan attackers, is to count the number of flows generated by
each host within a measurement period [6], [92]. We counted the number of
destination IP addresses from each source node for the host-degree information
and counted the number of destination ports from each source node for the portdegree information on each day. If the host-degree or port-degree of a node is
greater than a threshold, there is a high possibility that the node was an attack node
that has scanned multiple hosts or ports. Besides, as we described in Section 2.3, if
nodes a and b share at least one common destination, they are connected in the
bipartite network projection [58]. Ding et al. formed a projection graph to identify
communities in the network and utilized it to find malicious nodes, which do not
respect community boundaries, by using the betweenness centrality and clustering
coefficient in [6]. This dissertation also employs the betweenness centrality and
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clustering coefficient to identify the nodes that do not respect community
boundaries, that are calculated from the projection graph by using the MatlabBGL
package in Matlab [93].

C. Trust Calculation: This dissertation proposes and employes the modified Beta
reputation with heavy-tailed outlier-based adaptive threshold for the trust
computation (Section 3.3). By using the heavy-tailed outlier detection method, we
set the MaxTh and MinTh to determine normal, malicious, and suspicious
behaviors for the modified Beta reputation. By using the adaptive thresholds, we
calculate the trust values for the host-degree, port-degree, and betweenness
centrality for each node on each day. We use the static thresholds for clustering
coefficient that does not follow the heavy-tailed distribution.

D. Evaluation: We search for malicious behaviors in the European dataset network
flows during the 14 days based on the trust values. We select the sample malicious
nodes in Section 4.4.2 by sorting the latest trust values in the ascending order and
look for the attack signatures in Section 2.6.1.

E. Comparison: The European dataset uses the DShield Logs as the ground truth
dataset. Using the proposed methods, we detect malicious nodes and check
whether the detected nodes are listed in the DShield Logs. Through this step, we
verify the proposed methods as well as the DShield Logs.
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4.4.1.3 URI dataset analysis scenario
The University of Rhode Island (URI) Network Dataset has been analyzed
through several steps as shown in Figure 34. In this section, we describe each step
from the data collection to evaluation.

Figure 34. Data Analysis Scenario of the URI dataset
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A. Collect raw data: As described in Section 1.3, the dataset has been collected by
University of Rhode Island Information Technology Service (URI-ITS) for 90
days, and it sampled 1:100. This data does not contain the ground truth of attacks,
but it does contain a list of URI servers that has been formed by performing port
scanning on the network of University of Rhode Island (URI).

B. Clean up the network flows of DNS servers: A Domain Name System (DNS)
server runs a service that translates more readily memorized domain names to the
numerical identification of addressing component. For example, DNS servers
provide responses to the queries of human-memorable domain names and
hostnames with the corresponding numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Since
most of the connections from the outside of the university access to the URI-DNS
server to search the matching IP addresses, the server showed extremely high outdegree and in-degree. More specifically, the top hierarchy of the DNS is served by
the root name servers maintained by delegation by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Below the root, Internet resources are
organized into a hierarchy of domains, administered by the respective registers and
domain name holders [94]. If a name server does not have information that can
answer the query it may recursively query name servers higher up in the hierarchy.
Because of this nature of DNS servers, the servers generally have many
destinations that is enough to distract the degree based statistical analysis. Thus,
we have cleaned up the network flows of the URI-DNS servers in this research for
a more accurate statistical analysis and evaluation.
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C. Infer node characteristics from the network flows: As discussed in Section
4.4.1.1, the degree represents the number of edges from the vertex and to the
vertex, and this information can be very valuable information for detecting attacks
such as DDoS, probing, and etc. [6], [58]. We characterize each node by using the
host-degrees, port-degrees, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient. This
stage infers these node characteristics from the URI network flows datasets.
Specifically, the host-degrees and port-degrees are computed by counting the
number of connections from each source node from the bipartite graph, and the
betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient that used for identifying the
nodes that do not respect community boundaries are computed from the projection
graph by using the MatlabBGL [93].

D. Separate the nodes into URI and non-URI: Since we are more interested in
detecting attacks and/or malicious behaviors from/to the university network. Thus,
we separate the dataset into two parts; URI and non-URI nodes based on the IP
addresses that are assigned to the University of Rhode Island. For our
convenience, we defined a few terms for the flows.
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Figure 35. Definitions of terms of the network flows

a. URI nodes, From flows: The source IP addresses belong to the URI
Network and the destination IP addresses do not belong to the URI
Network.
b. non-URI nodes, To flows: The source IP addresses do not belong to
the URI Network, and the destination IP addresses belong to the URI
Network.

E. Separate the nodes into server and client: We have also separated the URI
nodes into two parts; URI servers (or simply, servers) and URI clients (or simply,
clients) because we assumed that server and client nodes have different hostdegree and port-degree characteristics. To collect the information of the server and
client nodes, we have composed a port scanning technique to the URI network and
searched the service information on each URI nodes. This research expectation is
that the server nodes would have different outliers from the client nodes group
because the servers generally get connection requests rather than requesting
connections. However, there are three facts that we need to consider. First, the port
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scanning technique does not guarantee it detects all the open ports because some
systems employ protection techniques that do not reveal the information. Second,
even if any ports are opened on a node, it does not mean that the node is a server,
but it can be used as a server. Third, all the scanned ports are not opened for
providing services as a server. Thus, this dissertation considers the ports that
provide popular services as shown in Table 13.

Service

Port Number

File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

21

Secure Shell (SSH)

22

Telnet remote login service

23

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)

25

Domain Name System (DNS) service

53

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)

80

Post Office Protocol (POP3)
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Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)

143

HTTP Secure (HTTPS)

443

SMTP Secure (SMTPS)

465

Table 13. List of the Well-Known Ports

F. Trust Calculation: We set the MaxTh and MinTh to determine normal, malicious,
and suspicious behaviors for the modified Beta reputation by using the heavytailed outlier method and calculated the trust values for the host-degree, portdegree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality for each node on each
day.
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G. Evaluation: We search malicious behaviors patterns in the URI network flows
during the 90 days based on the trust values. We present examples of a few
malicious nodes in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 and summarize the results for the
whole URI data in Section 4.6 and 4.7.

4.4.2 Experimental results
In this section, we will show how the trust management scheme can be used to
identify the malicious nodes. The detected malicious nodes in the European dataset
will be compared to the DShield Logs. We will verify the proposed methods as well as
the DShield Logs. The URI dataset will show how the trust management scheme
works on a large dataset including the long-term redemption. Since there does not
exist ground truth of the attack nodes for the URI datasets, we rely on the collected
raw data and human expert to verify the relationships between the trust and malicious
behaviors. Therefore, we have built a database system that can retrieve the raw data by
using SQL, and we will use the raw data to confirm the malicious behaviors.
By using the calculated trust values, we will take a second look at the behaviors
and evaluate the trust values node by node. We illustrate behaviors of a few nodes
similar to a hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, or other types of attacks. We also use for
illustration the nodes that show the behaviors of one of the attacks but are not listed in
the DShield Logs to demonstrate that these logs are not a perfect representation of all
malicious nodes.
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4.4.2.1 Normal nodes

(a). The host-degrees of a normal node

(b). The port-degrees of a normal node
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(c). The betweenness centrality of a normal node

(d). The clustering coefficient of a normal node
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(e). The trust changes of a normal node
Figure 36. A normal node that has not been classified as malicious
Figure 36 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a normal
node that is not listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme has
classified this as a normal node. The host-degree, port-degree, and betweenness
centrality never exceeded the MinTh as shown in Figure 36.(a), (b), and (c)
respectively. Figure 36.(d) shows that the clustering coefficient also never went below
the static threshold 0.95. This means that the node has executed neither hostscan nor
portscan signatures/behaviors, and so it is expected to have the high HT, PT, CCT,
BCT, PRT, and OT values as shown in Figure 36.(e).
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4.4.2.2 Hostscan attacks

(a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node

(b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node
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(c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node

(d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node
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(e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node
Figure 37. A hostscan attack node that has been classified as malicious
Figure 37 shows each behavior and the corresponding trust changes of a node that
has been listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme classified as a
hostscan attack node. The red lines in Figure 37.(a), (b), (c), and (d) represent the
node’s behaviors during the 14 days, and the trust values have been calculated based
on the behaviors. We could observe the host-degrees exceeded the MaxTh (blue line)
every day, the port-degrees slightly exceeded the MinTh (green line) except on the 5th
day, the betweenness centrality exceeded the MinTh only once on the 4th day but never
exceeded the MaxTh, and the clustering coefficient were below the static threshold
0.95 every day. Therefore, we can expect that the Host Trust (HT), Betweenness
Centrality Trust (BCT), Clustering Coefficient Trust (CCT), Predictability Trust
(PRT), and Overall Trust (OT) will be low while the Port Trust (PT) will be high. The
blue line in Figure 37.(e) represents PT over the 14 days, and it showed the high trust
116

values while the HT (red line), CCT (green line), BCT (yellow line), PRT (purple line),
and OT (cyan line) showed low values as we expected.
The hostscan attack nodes tend to show high host-degrees and low port-degrees
as we described in Section 2.6.1.1. Therefore, we can specify the attack nodes that
showed the hostscan patterns during the 14 days by searching the low HT and high PT.
Besides, we could observe that the nodes with low HT also showed low CCT and low
BCT because a node with high port-degrees would have high possibility to be
connected to many communities. Thus, the hostscan attack node also showed a type of
behaviors that do not respect the community boundaries (Section 2.3.4 and 2.3.5). We
also were able to classify the node as malicious with the low PRT and OT. These
results shows that the proposed trust management scheme could cautiously detect a
hostscan attack node in a dynamic environment by decreasing each trust gradually and
integrate them together.
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(a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows

(b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows
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(c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows

(d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows
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(e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows
Figure 38. A hostscan attack node that has been showed in the non-URI flows
We were also able to observe the same attack in the URI dataset. Figure 38 shows
the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a non-URI node that was
suspected as a hostscan attack node. The node also showed higher host-degrees than
the MaxTh except for the 9 times on April 16th, 17th, and 18th and May 14th, 15th, 19th,
20th, 22nd, and 25th during the 90 days, so we could expect the low HT, PRT, and OT
values. We also could expect the high PT values because the node tried to access to
only 1 port every day. This node tried to access to the port 0 (invalid port number),
which frequently has been used by attackers, on 5,268 different destination IP
addresses that belong to URI network. The results also illustrate the need of Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) because the firewall, which is the first line of a security
system (Section 1.1), could not detect and allowed the hostscan attacks.
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The betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient in Figure 38.(c) and (d) also
showed malicious behaviors every day during the 90 days. The high betweenness
centrality represents that the node worked as a bridge between the communities, which
share the destination nodes with other nodes, and the node belonged to many
communities. Besides, the low clustering coefficient illustrated that the node was not
densely connected with the neighbors. Thus, the BCT and CCT showed low values in
Figure 38.(e), and the values represented the node did not respect the community
boundaries [6].

(a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the URI-server flows
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(b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server flows

(c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server
flows
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(d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server
flows

(e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server flows
Figure 39. A hostscan attack node that has been showed in the URI- server
flows
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These results shows that the network flows might need to be analyzed separately
depending on the location of nodes, such as URI and non-URI nodes. Figure 39 shows
the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node in the URI-server flows
that showed a hostscan attack pattern. This node had 52 open ports and got connection
requests to 66 different ports from 3,699 different source IP addresses. The most
popular service was provided by the port 80 (HTTP), and 3,312 different source IP
addresses tried to access to this port. Besides, the port 25 (SMTP) and 23 (TELNET)
were accessed by 125 and 48 source IP addresses respectively. Thus, the node was a
high probability of being a server.
The host-degrees of the node exceeded the MaxTh every day in Figure 39.(a), so
we could expect low HT values with the low PRT and OT values. On the other hand,
the port-degree exceed the MinTh only 18 times but never exceeded the MaxTh during
the 90 days, so the high PT was expected. Therefore, we could suspect this node might
be a hostscan node because these results match the signature of the hostscan in Section
2.6.1.1. The node tried to access to port 0 (invalid port number), 25 (SMTP), and 443
(HTTPS) on 1,888 different destination IP addresses. The port 0 is not a valid port
number, but the packets can be formed and frequently used for searching valid hosts
by attackers. Thus, this node was highly suspicious. By using the proposed trust
management scheme, we could observe the malicious behaviors over 90 days without
looking at the raw network flows closely. However, this node might not be classified
as hostscan node in the client node group because the MinTh and MaxTh for the hostdegree in this figure were much lower than the values in Figure 38.
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4.4.2.3 Portscan attacks

(a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node

(b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node
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(c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node

(d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node
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(e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node
Figure 40. A portscan attack node that has been classified as malicious
Figure 40 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that
has been listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme classified as a
portscan attack node. The host-degrees of the node showed interesting behaviors that
placed in the suspicious area, which is between the MinTh and MaxTh, as shown in
Figure 40.(a). Since the host-degrees were suspicious, we can expect that the HT will
be lower than the normal nodes. Even though the host-degrees were placed in the
suspicious area, they were closer to the MinTh than the MaxTh, and it was enough to
increase the HT rather than decreasing the values as shown in Figure 40.(e). If the
behaviors were closer to the MaxTh than the MinTh, we could expect that the HT was
slowly getting decreased but not as much as a node that showed higher host-degrees
than the MaxTh during the 14 days. On the other hand, the port-degrees were above
the MaxTh during the 14 days except on the 6th, 11th, and 13th days in Figure 40.(b).
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However, even the behaviors in the 3 days were very close to the MaxTh, and they
were enough to decrease the PT. Besides, the node did not connect with the neighbors
strongly enough to have high clustering coefficients as shown in Figure 40.(d). The
clustering coefficient values were below the static threshold 0.95 during the 14 days,
and it decreased the CCT as shown in Figure 40.(e). The betweenness centrality values
showed a kind of On-off patterns as shown in Figure 40.(c). It was below the MinTh
on the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 10th, 12th, and 13th days while it was above the MaxTh on the 2nd and
5th days. The behaviors on the 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, and 14th were placed in the
suspicious area. The behaviors were enough to increase the BCT as shown in Figure
40.(e), but it could decrease the PRT even if the six out of fourteen behaviors were
classified as normal. The NPB would be 3, and the MPB would be 2 in (5) on the 14th
day, so the PTR would be 0.57 if we assumed that the other behaviors were classified
as normal, and only the betweenness centrality behaved as shown in Figure 40.(c). It
would be much lower than the BCT shown in Figure 40.(e) that was 0.7, and it shows
the PTR would work as we expected that was described in Section 2.4.3 and 3.3.
The portscan attack nodes tend to show low host-degrees and high port-degrees as
we described in Section 2.6.1.2. Therefore, we can specify the nodes that showed
portscan patterns during the 14 days by searching the high HT and low PT. The low
CCT and BCT showed the possibility that the node also performed a kind of behaviors
that did not respect the communities’ boundaries. The PRT and OT also could be a
clue that the trust management scheme successfully detected the malicious behaviors.
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(a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node in the URI-server flows

(b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node in the URI-server flows
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(c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node in the URI-server
flows

(d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node in the URI-server flows
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(e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node in the URI- server flows
Figure 41. A portscan attack node that has been showed in the URI- server
flows
The trust management scheme was able to complement a weakness of the outlierbased adaptive threshold. Figure 41 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust
changes of a URI-server node that showed portscan attack pattern during the 90 days.
This node had 33 open ports and got connection requests to 43 different ports from
137 different source IP addresses. The most popular port was 23 (TELNET), and 38
nodes tried to access to this port. The second popular port was 5,000 (UPNP-EVNT)
that is used by Universal Plug N’ Play devices, and both ports could provide services
as a server.
This node has tried to access to 17 different ports including 0 on 155 different
destination IP address, and the node showed one suspicious behavior pattern, which
tried to access from port 26,116 to 26,196 by increasing 10 on one target IP address.
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Therefore, the port-degrees in Figure 41.(b) showed relatively high values while the
host-degrees in Figure 41.(a) exceed the MinTh only twice on February 23rd and May
20th but never exceeded the MaxTh during the 90 days, so we could expect the high
HT and low PT. Since the port-degrees exceeded 81 times during the 90 days, the low
PRT and OT also could be expected. The results showed similar patterns to the node in
Figure 40 that has been classified as malicious by DShield Logs and the trust
management scheme.
While the trust management scheme was able to detect the malicious behavior
patterns, Figure 41.(b) also showed a weakness of the outlier-based adaptive threshold,
which is the relatively high MaxTh. For example, the node showed exactly the same
behaviors on May 11th and 12th, but the same behaviors were evaluated in different
ways. The port-degree on May 12th was classified as malicious behavior while the
behavior on May 11th was classified as suspicious due to the high MaxTh. Even
though the behaviors were evaluated in different ways, the trust management scheme
was able to keep the PT in low values due to the previously observed malicious
behaviors.
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(a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows

(b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows

133

(c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows

(d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows
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(e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows
Figure 42. A portscan attack node that has been showed in the non-URI flows
The node in Figure 42 showed even more obvious portscan behaviors than the
nodes in Figure 40 and Figure 41. The node tried to access to 8,992 different ports
from 49,152 to 65,531 by increasing 1 or 2 on a single node in the URI network. Thus,
the node showed low host-degrees in Figure 41.(a) and high port-degrees in Figure
41.(b). Our trust management scheme increased the HT while decreasing the PT, PRT,
and OT in Figure 41.(e) based on the behaviors. We were able to detect the malicious
behavior patterns with the low PRT and OT and specified the portscan patterns with
the high HT and low PT. Besides the betweenness centrality in Figure 41.(c) and
clustering coefficient in Figure 41.(d) showed that the node was not a type of attack
that did not respect the community boundaries, so the node had high BCT and CCT.
The node was not active from February 18th to 25th and March 11th, and the
Figure 41.(e) showed that the inactive dates could not affect the trust calculations as
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we designed in Section 3.3. Besides, the Figure 41.(b) showed a vulnerability of the
adaptive threshold that was observed from May 18th to 28th. The behaviors were not
much different from the other days that have been classified as malicious, but the
behaviors were classified as suspicious due to the relatively high outliers on the days.
The trust management scheme was also able to keep the low PT values with the
previously observed malicious behaviors.

4.4.2.4 Hybrid-scan attacks

(a). The host-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node
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(b). The port-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node

(c). The betweenness centrality of a hybrid-scan attack node
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(d). The clustering coefficient of a hybrid-scan attack node

(e). The trust changes of a hybrid-scan attack node
Figure 43. A hybrid-scan attack node that has been classified as malicious
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Figure 43 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that
has been listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme classified as a
hybrid-scan node. The port-degrees and clustering coefficient values clearly showed
malicious behaviors in Figure 43.(b) and (d), the host-degrees were placed above the
MaxTh except on the 5th day as shown in Figure 43.(a), and the betweenness centrality
showed higher values than the MaxTh except on the 3rd day in Figure 43.(c).
Therefore, we cannot expect high HT, PT, CCT, BCT, PRT, or OT, and they were
shown in Figure 43.(e).
As we described in Section 2.6.1.3, the hybrid-scan attack nodes tend to show
high host-degrees and port-degrees. Thus, we can specify the nodes that showed
hybrid-scan patterns during the 14 days by searching the low HT and PT. The CCT
and BCT showed the low value, this is one type of the attacks that do not respect
community boundaries. The PRT and OT can also be used for detecting malicious
nodes.
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(a). The host-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client flows

(b). The port-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client flows
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(c). The betweenness centrality of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client
flows

(d). The clustering coefficient of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client
flows
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(e). The trust changes of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client flows
Figure 44. A hybrid-scan attack node that has been showed in the URI-client
flows
Figure 44 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node in
the URI-client flows that showed the hybrid-scan attack patterns, which was described
in Section 2.6.1.3. The node tried to access to 4,376 different ports on 54,808 different
destination IP addresses during the 90 days. The node showed higher host-degrees
than the MaxTh every day, and the pot-degrees showed higher values than the MaxTh
except on the May 11th, so we could expect the low HT and PT along with the low
PRT and OT. The low PRT and OT could indicate the existence of attack patterns, and
we could specify the type of the attacks as hybrid-scan with the low HT and PT values.
Besides, we also could indicate that the type of attacks did not respect the
communities’ boundaries with the low BCT and CCT.
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4.4.2.5 Misclassified nodes
In the previous section, we looked at a few nodes that both the DShield Logs and
our trust management scheme agreed that the nodes were malicious. On the contrary,
we will show a few nodes that the trust management scheme suspected they were
malicious nodes while the DShield Logs failed to classify as malicious. The looked at
a few nodes that have behaved like the nodes in the previous section, and they can also
be classified as malicious with the definitions in Section 2.6.1.

(a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node
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(b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node

(c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node
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(d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node

(e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node
Figure 45. A hostscan attack node that has not been classified as malicious
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As we can see in Figure 45, the behaviors of the node showed very similar
patterns to the node in Figure 37, which both the DShield Logs and our trust
management scheme agreed the node was a hostscan attack node. Every host-degree
was above the MaxTh except on the 6th day, and every port-degree was placed in the
suspicious area close to the MinTh except on the 5th, 6th, and 13th days (Figure 45.(a)
and (b)). These patterns match the signature of hostscan attack nodes that was
presented in Section 2.6.1.1. However, the node has not been listed in the DShield
Logs and classified as normal node while the proposed trust management scheme
suspected that the node was a malicious node based on the low HT, CCT, BCT, PRT
and OT, and we specified the node was a hostscan attack node based on the low HT
and high PT. This shows that the DShield Logs failed to list all the hostscan attack
nodes.

(a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node
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(b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node

(c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node
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(d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node

(e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node
Figure 46. A portscan attack node that has not been classified as malicious

148

The node in Figure 46 also showed even more obvious behavior patterns of the
portscan than the node in Figure 40, which both the DShield Logs and our trust
management scheme agreed the node was a portscan attack node. The node tried to
connect to more than 700 ports on a single destination node during the 14 days as
shown in Figure 46.(a) and (b). However, this node also has not been listed in the
DShield Logs and classified as normal node like the node in Figure 36. Our trust
management scheme suspected the node was a malicious node based on the low PT,
PRT and OT, and we specified the node was a portscan attack node based on the high
HT and low PT. This result also shows that there is a relationship among the hostdegree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality as shown in Figure 46.(c)
and (d). Since every port-degree exceeded the MaxTh, the PRT and OT also had low
values.

(a). The host-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node
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(b). The port-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node

(c). The betweenness centrality of a hybrid-scan attack node
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(d). The clustering coefficient of a hybrid-scan attack node

(e). The trust changes of a hybrid-scan attack node
Figure 47. A hybrid-scan attack node that has not been classified as malicious
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Figure 47 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that
was suspected of performing hybrid-scan attacks during the 14 days. The node showed
high host-degree and port-degree in Figure 47.(a) and (b) that exceeded the MaxTh.
The behaviors were very similar to the node in Figure 43, which was classified by the
DShield Logs and our trust management scheme. The behavior patterns also match the
behavior signature of a hybrid-scan attack node as described in Section 2.6.1.3.
However, the node has not been listed in the DShield Logs and considered as a normal
node. Our trust management scheme was able to detect the attacking behaviors with
the low HT, PT, CCT, BCT, PRT and OT, and we specified the node was a hybrid-scan
attack node based on the low HT and PT.
To sum up, section 4.4 showed that the proposed trust management scheme
successfully detected the hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, and any types of attacks that
do not respect the community boundaries. Each trust value represented the behaviors
of the host-degree, port-degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality
respectively and used for classifying the type of attacks. Also, the experiments showed
that the predictability trust and overall trust successfully integrated the multiple trust
values into one. The trust management scheme also carefully evaluated each node by
providing a cumulative evaluation method and gradually decreased the trust value as
the system observed more malicious behaviors. Besides, we showed that the DShield
Logs cannot be a perfect representation of all malicious nodes in section 4.4.2.5 by
presenting a few examples that showed the same behavior patterns of scanning attacks
but were not classified as malicious nodes.
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4.5 The trust management scheme in special cases
The trust management was employed for providing a method to avoid erroneously
labeling nodes with a few malicious behaviors in a system (Section 2.4.3 and 2.6.2)
and providing second chances to the nodes in a system with trust redemption method
(Section 2.4.3). Thus, the trust management scheme allows redemption of the trust as
the node behaves normally. However, some smart attacker might use the redemption
method and could disturb the evaluation method, so the Predictability trust (PRT) has
been developed to detect on-off attacks that the modified Beta reputation method was
not able to detect as we discussed in Section 3.3. In this section, we will provide a few
examples that the trust management scheme considered as a temporary error or
suspected as malicious. Besides, this section presents the long-term redemption of the
PRT that allows a second chance to a malicious node based on a long-term observation
(Section 2.4.3.2).
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4.5.1 Evaluation of one temporary error

(a). The betweenness centrality of a temporary error node

(b). The clustering coefficient of a temporary error node
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(c). The trust changes of a temporary error node
Figure 48. A node that showed a temporary error
Figure 48 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that
the trust management scheme believed that the malicious behavior was a temporary
error or a mistake. The node’s betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient
showed only one malicious behavior on the 12th day as shown in Figure 48.(a) and (b),
so the BCT and CCT were lowered once in Figure 48.(c). As the malicious behavior
was observed, the PRT was lowered on the same day. However, it was the only one
malicious behavior of the node, so the trust management scheme wanted to give a
second chance by recovering the BCT and CCT from the 13th day, which the node
showed normal behaviors again. Since the current size of the NBW was 5 and the
current size of the MBW was 24 due to the OT value, which was 0.714 on the 14th day,
the PRT will start recovering the value after pushing the malicious behavior out from
the NBW, which needs to observe three more normal behaviors.
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The secure system might produce another victim that has been stolen the identity
by attackers if the system blocks based on a few malicious behaviors (Section 2.6.2).
As we can see in this case, the trust management scheme can provide a second chance
to the node because the malicious behavior could be a temporary error while it also
does not easily recover the trust as shown in the case of PRT.

4.5.2 Evaluation of on-off attacks

(a). The clustering coefficient of an on-off attack node
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(b). The trust changes of an on-off attack node
Figure 49. A suspected on-off attack node
The trust management scheme suspected that the node in Figure 49 could be an
On-off attack node. The PRT and OT were lowered based on the malicious behaviors
on the 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 11th days because the clustering coefficient showed malicious
behaviors on the same days in Figure 49.(a). The behaviors in Figure 49.(a) showed a
kind of On-off attack patterns that show normal and malicious behaviors alternatively,
so the increase and decrease of the CCT repeatedly appeared in Figure 49.(b). As a
result of the patterns, the CCT was bounded between 0.57 and 0.66 while the PRT
gradually lowered the value. The Figure 49.(b) showed that the PRT has successfully
detected the On-off patterns by extending the size of the sliding window.
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4.5.3 Long-term redemption

(a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the URI-client flows

(b). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node in the URI-client flows
Figure 50. A hostscan attack node that has been showed in the URI-client flows
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We were able to observe that the trust management successfully specified the
hostscan attack patterns of a node and the trust redemption in these results. Figure 50
shows each behavior and the corresponding trust changes of a node in the URI-client
flows that showed hostscan attack patterns, and we detected the patterns with our trust
management scheme. The host-degrees in Figure 50.(a) exceeded every day, and we
could expect the low HT because the behaviors matched the attack signature of
hostscan in Section 2.6.1.1. Since the trust management scheme observed the
malicious behaviors from the host-degrees, the PRT was decreased with the OT.
Therefore, we were able to detect a pattern of attacks with the OT and specified the
attack as hostscan.
The node has tried to access to the port 80(HTTP) and 445(Microsoft Directory
Services) on 19,926 different destination IP address. Especially, the port 445 has been
targeted by many attackers because it has the great vulnerability originally created by
Windows file sharing, which may allow the attackers could gain remote access to the
contents of hard disk directories or drives [95]. After the first 17 days, the node has
been inactive until the last observed day due to either blocked by URI firewall or
changed the identity. There is also a possibility that the firewall blocked the IP address
and the attack node changed the identity for the other attacks. The trust management
scheme can provide a second chance to the IP address by pushing out the previous
malicious behaviors from the sliding windows because it would be a waste of the
resources if the firewall keeps blocking the IP address. So, our trust management
scheme started recovering the PRT from May 7th gradually as shown in Figure 50.(b).
However, if a malicious behavior happens while it was recovering the trust, it would
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drop the trust immediately with the previously observed malicious behaviors that have
not been pushed out from the sliding windows yet.

4.6 URI summarized results
In this section, we show the summarized analysis results of the URI dataset. In
statistical analysis-based ADS, the systems detect malicious behaviors in low
probability regions while the normal behaviors occur in high probability regions.
Malicious nodes cannot be detected if a threshold is too high while normal nodes can
be classified as malicious if a threshold is too low as we discussed in Section 2.5 and
4.3.1. The main advantage of employing the adaptive thresholds method is that the
system can set an appropriate threshold in a dynamic environment. We found that the
adaptive thresholds maintained a similar pattern of the detection ratio of each normal,
suspicious, and malicious nodes in a dynamic environment. Also, we compared the
detection rates and the two thresholds of the adaptive thresholds method for different
periods, which are during the semester, break, and final exam periods.
This section only summarized the observations in the URI dataset, and the more
detailed report for the observation will be presented in the future manuscripts. Please
note that this section did not include the clustering coefficients. Since the values do
not show the heavy-tailed distribution as we showed in Section 4.3.3, we did not apply
the adaptive threshold for the clustering coefficients.
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4.6.1

Host degrees

On average, over the 90 days, the nodes showed higher host degrees in the order
of URI clients (20.43), URI servers (15.95), and non-URI nodes (2.23). Therefore, the
[Average MinTh (95% Confidence Interval) / Average MaxTh (95% Confidence
Interval)] of the adaptive thresholds were different for each node type. The client
nodes showed the averages [10.40 (±0.98) / 41.53 (±3.65)], the server nodes showed
the averages [2.82 (±0.21)) / 9.10 (±1.08)], and the non-URI nodes showed the
averages [1.43 (±0.02) / 3.88 (±1.08)].

Figure 51. The host degree-based detection rates of the client nodes
In general, the thresholds of the client nodes during the semester [11.09 (±1.13) /
43.82 (±4.13)] were greater than during the break [8.38 (±1.80) / 34.87 (±7.16)] and
smaller than during the final exam [11.87 (±1.87) / 47.33 (±7.53)]. Figure 51 shows
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that the detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes have the similar
patterns no matter in which period the data have been collected, even though different
time periods have different MinTh and MaxTh. At the same time, the client nodes
show pretty different patterns between the weekdays and weekends. In general, the
thresholds of the client nodes in the weekdays [12.93 (±0.62) / 50.90 (±2.31)] are
greater than the thresholds in the weekends [3.44 (±0.14) / 15.75 (±0.78)], and the
detection rates of the malicious nodes on the weekends are greater than the detection
rates on the weekdays.

Figure 52. The host degree-based detection rates of the server nodes
In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [3.06 (±0.24) /
10.46 (±1.25)] are greater than during the break [2.06 (±0.19) / 5.36 (±0.99)] and
smaller than the thresholds during the final exam [2.37 (±0.33) / 7.33 (±2.61)]. Figure
52 also shows that the detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes
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have similar patterns no matter in which period the data have been collected, even
though different time periods have required different MinTh and MaxTh. Meanwhile,
unlikely the client nodes, the server nodes display very similar patterns between the
weekdays and weekends. On average, the thresholds of the server host-degrees on the
weekdays [3.23 (±0.21) / 11.37 (±1.05)] are greater than the thresholds on the
weekends [1.71 (±0.09) / 3.33 (±0.30)]. Since some server nodes may work like the
client nodes, the resulting host-degree MinTh and MaxTh are different on the
weekdays and weekends.

Figure 53. The host degree-based detection rates of the non-URI nodes
While the URI nodes require relatively higher thresholds during the semester, the
non-URI nodes have resulted in the lowest host-degree thresholds during the semester.
In general, the thresholds during the semester [1.45 (±0.03) / 24 (±5.48)] are smaller
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than during the break [1.37 (±0.05) / 82.22 (±27.05)] and smaller than during the final
exams [1.37 (±0.09) / 79.00 (±62.88)]. Figure 53 shows that the normal nodes
detection rates during the break are relatively greater than during the semester because
the suspicious nodes detection rates have decreased during the break. However, the
malicious nodes detection rates were similar no matter in which period the dataset has
been collected. Meanwhile, the host-degree thresholds on the weekdays [1.41 (±0.03) /
39.86 (±11.82)] and on the weekends [1.47 (±0.05) / 36.17 (±15.06)] show similar
values, implying that the behaviors of non-URI nodes are not affected by the
weekdays and weekends. The detection rates on the weekdays and weekends also
show similar patterns.

4.6.2 Port degrees
On average, over the 90 days, the nodes show higher port degrees in the order of
server (2.83), client (2.63), and non-URI nodes (1.17), and we have expected that the
values [Average MinTh (95% Confidence Interval) / Average MaxTh (95% Confidence
Interval)] of the adaptive thresholds to be placed in the same order. However, the
adaptive thresholds have resulted in a different order. The client nodes have resulted in
the average thresholds of [1.90 (±0.06) / 5.90 (±0.54)], the non-URI nodes have
resulted in the averages of [1.07 (±0.00) / 2.92 (±0.06)], and the server nodes have
resulted in the averages of [1.41 (±0.01) / 1.84 (±0.11)]. This supports the fact that the
port degrees of the server nodes are relatively evenly distributed on each day.
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Figure 54. The port degree-based detection rates of the client nodes
In general, the thresholds of the client nodes during the semester [1.95 (±0.07) /
6.25 (±0.63)] are greater than during the break [1.79 (±0.14) / 4.87 (±0.98)] and
similar to during the final exam [2.04 (±0.07) / 6.67 (±0.65)]. Figure 54 shows that the
detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes result in similar patterns
no matter in which period the data have been collected. Meanwhile, the rates of the
normal and suspicious nodes are very different on the weekdays and weekends. The
thresholds of the client nodes in the weekdays [2.07 (±0.04) / 7.21 (±0.40)] were
greater than the thresholds in the weekends [1.46 (±0.04) / 2.29 (±0.19)]. If we look
only at the detection rates on the weekdays, the detection rates of the normal nodes are
pretty stable with the average of 73.71% and the standard deviation 4.34%. At the
same time, the detection rates of the normal nodes on the weekends were varied with
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the average of 65.78% and the standard deviation 17.24%. However, the detection
rates of the malicious nodes are similar every day.

Figure 55. The port degree-based detection rates of the server nodes
In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [1.42 (±0.02) /
2.00 (±0.00)] were similar to during the break [1.35 (±0.02) / 2.00 (±0.00)] and similar
to during the final [1.39 (±0.02) / 2.00 (±0.00)]. The detection rates of the normal,
suspicious, and malicious nodes changed many times as shown in Figure 55. However,
the detection rates of the malicious nodes were relatively stable compare to the normal
and suspicious nodes with the average 6.94% and standard deviation 3.59%.
Meanwhile, the thresholds in the weekdays [1.44 (±0.01) / 2.00 (±0.0)] and in the
weekends [1.31 (±0.01) / 2.00 (±0.00)] did not affect a lot to the detection rates of the
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malicious nodes; average 4.90% and standard deviation 3.79% in the weekdays and
average 7.68% and standard deviation 3.24% in the weekends.

Figure 56. The port degree-based detection rates of the non-URI nodes
We observed that the periods of the data collection do not affect a lot to the port
degree-based detection of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes in non-URI
nodes. In general, the thresholds of the non-URI nodes during the semester [1.08
(±0.00) / 2.99 (±0.03)] were similar to during the break [1.07 (±0.01) / 2.74 (±0.22)]
and similar to during the final [1.08 (±0.01) / 3.00 (±0.00)]. Meanwhile, the thresholds
of the nodes in the weekdays [1.07 (±0.00) / 2.94 (±0.07)] were also similar to the
thresholds in the weekends [1.08 (±0.01) / 2.88 (±0.14)]. As shown in Figure 56, the
detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes maintained similar
patterns for the 90 days no matter in which period the dataset has been collected.
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4.6.3

Betweenness centrality

On average, over the 90 days, the nodes showed higher betweenness centrality
values in the order of non-URI (59273.84), server (3163.00), and client (2609.06). We
also expected that the [Average MinTh (95% Confidence Interval) / Average MaxTh
(95% Confidence Interval)] of the adaptive threshold will be higher in the order of the
average betweenness centrality values. However, the non-URI nodes showed the
averages [66299.43 (±6330.96) / 489598.11 (±107872.60)], the client nodes showed
the averages [1131.25 (±58.29) / 4087.00 (±161.99)], and the server showed the
averages [264.90 (±41.51) / 976.75 (±159.97)]. These values also showed that the
betweenness centrality values of the server nodes were relatively evenly distributed on
each day.

Figure 57. The betweenness centrality-based detection rates of the client nodes
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In general, the thresholds of the client nodes during the semester [1172.13
(±66.20) / 4194.34 (±176.12)] were greater than during the break [1012.17 (±110.25) /
3774.31 (±348.37)] and slightly smaller than during the final [1142.43 (±211.72) /
4287.33 (±559.24)]. Figure 57 shows that the detection rates of the normal, suspicious,
and malicious nodes showed the similar patterns no matter in which period the dataset
has been collected with the different MinTh and MaxTh. Meanwhile, the thresholds of
the client nodes in the weekdays [1272.24 (±42.55) / 4453.63 (±133.18)] were greater
than the thresholds in the weekends [743.55 (±31.50) / 3078.76 (±106.71)]. The
detection rates of the malicious nodes in the weekdays, which showed the average
14.60% with standard deviation 0.79%, showed more stable detection rates than in the
weekends, which showed the average 18.27% with the standard deviation 6.59%.

Figure 58. The betweenness centrality-based detection rates of the server nodes
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In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [310.11
(±49.07) / 1198.24 (±189.42)] were greater than during the break [124.97 (±34.22) /
477.23 (±143.65)] and greater than during the final [158.74 (±91.43) / 678.87
(±511.77)]. As shown in Figure 58, the detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and
malicious nodes also showed the similar patterns no matter in which period the dataset
has been collected with the different MinTh and MaxTh. Meanwhile, the thresholds of
the client nodes in the weekdays [342.02 (±41.20) / 1130.38 (±155.87)] were greater
than the thresholds in the weekends [40.56 (±8.87) / 125.61 (±28.60)]. The detection
rates of the malicious nodes in the weekdays, which showed the average 13.48% with
standard deviation 0.76%, showed more stable detection rates than in the weekends,
which showed the average 16.34% with the standard deviation 2.17%.

Figure 59. The betweenness centrality-based detection rates of the non-URI
nodes
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In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [67997.48
(±7442.53) / 535542.23 (±139805.04)] were greater than during the break [61352.92
(±12028.11) / 355760.87 (±95888.34)] and greater than during the final [48243.67
(±2272.85) / 200748.90 (±21810.49)]. Figure 59 shows that the detection rates of the
normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes showed the similar patterns no matter in
which period the dataset has been collected with the different MinTh and MaxTh.
Meanwhile, the thresholds of the client nodes in the weekdays [71832.59 (±7721.01) /
519506.80 (±135633.33)] were greater than the thresholds in the weekends [51083.21
(±8097.82) / 407349.18 (±156022.24)]. Figure 59 also shows that the detection rates
were not affected by the weekdays and weekends.

4.7 Summary
Chapter 4 evaluated the proposed ADS with multiple experiments. Section 4.1
showed that the graph representation can reduce the network flows dataset drastically,
and Section 4.2 showed the trust management scheme can represent the results of
statistical analysis methods. Section 4.3 compared the adaptive threshold to static
thresholds and showed the adaptive threshold works better than the static thresholds in
a dynamic environment. Section 4.4 showed that the converted trust values were able
to detect the hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, and the types of attacks that do not
respect the community boundaries. The section also showed that the proposed method
can detect the attacks that even the DShield Logs [7] or Firewall could not detect.
Section 4.5 presented how the trust management scheme deals with three special
cases; 1) there was a temporary error looked like an attack, 2) if an attack node
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composed on-off attack to disturb the trust management scheme, and 3) how the trust
management scheme provides a second chance to a node. Section 4.6 summarized the
analysis results of the URI dataset and showed the detection rates of the URI nodes,
especially the client nodes, were affected by the weekdays and weekends due to the
different number of active nodes on campus while the non-URI maintained similar
detection rates with the different thresholds.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this final chapter, the main achievements of this research are summarized.
Moreover, there exist several directions that would help in further improving and
advancing the efficiency of the system.
This chapter will summarize the main achievements of this research from five
perspectives: the graph representation of network flows, characterization of each node
by using statistical analysis methods, representation of the results by using a trust
management scheme, the adaptive threshold, and the trust management scheme for
providing a method to avoid erroneously labeling nodes with a few malicious
behaviors. A summary of the experimental results will be presented, and this
dissertation closes with a brief discussion of future directions.
This dissertation showed that the graph representation can reduce the dataset by
removing duplicated relationships and the statistical analysis on the graph can
characterize each node’s behaviors. Also, we showed that how the trust management
can overcome the disadvantages of the statistical analysis-based IDS. The results that
were produced by statistical analyses were not intuitive because it was not clear
whether the bigger number meant normal or malicious. For instance, the high numbers
in the host-degree, port-degree, and betweenness centrality represent the malicious
behaviors while the low numbers in the clustering coefficient would be malicious. By
representing the results in the trust management scheme, we were able to produce
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intuitive results, which the low trust value represents more malicious. Moreover, the
trust management scheme made it possible to integrate various results of statistical
analysis methods into one by converting the results in the same range, between 0 and
1. We showed that the adaptive threshold worked better than static thresholds in a
dynamic environment because if a static threshold is too low, the rate of false positive
will be excessive, and if the threshold is too high, detection rate will be low. In
addition to the efficiency, the trust management scheme with the adaptive threshold
was able to represent how much the behavior closer to the normal or malicious
behavior. Moreover, a secure system needs to carefully evaluate each node before
blocking the suspicious nodes because there exist many methods that can hide the
identity of the attackers, and many normal users can be affected. The proposed ADS
could evaluate each node cautiously by providing cumulative evaluation by using the
trust management scheme with the adaptive threshold and could also detect the attacks
that even the DShield Logs or Firewall could not detect.
In our further work, we will show more analysis results of the URI dataset to
show the usability of the adaptive thresholds. We also would like to analyze more than
the host-degree, port-degree, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient. Since
we have collected more than the IP addresses and port information of the source and
destination nodes, the statistical analysis methods can be applied to the other
information, such as the countries, size of the packets, the location of the nods in the
university, the types of application, etc. The datasets may be considered as a big data,
and there exist many big data analysis methods. In the future research, we will apply
big data analysis methods and detect malicious behaviors in the network flows.

174

APPENDIX I
PSUEDOCODEDS
A. Pseudocode for the predictability trust
( NPB, MPB ) ← getPRTStatus ( bv_1, bv_2, bv_3, bv_4, NPB, MPB )
( bv_1.GB, bv_1.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_1 )
( bv_2.GB, bv_2.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_2 )
( bv_3.GB, bv_3.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_3 )
( bv_4.GB, bv_4.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_4 )
IF bv_1.BB == 1 || bv_2.BB == 1 || bv_3.BB == 1 || bv_4.BB == 1
NPB ← 0;
MPB ← 1;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
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ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1
NPB ← 1;
MPB ← 0;
ELIF bv_1.GB == 0 && bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 &&
bv_3.GB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0
NPB ← 0;
MPB ← 0;
ELSE
DISP(‘ERROR’)
END IF
RETURN NPB, MPB

( GB, BB ) ← getBVStatus ( bv )
IF bv.bv >= bv.MaxTh
GB ← 0
BB ← 1
ELIF bv.bv <= bv.MinTh
GB ← 1
BB ← 0
ELSE
GB ← 0
BB ← 0
END IF
RETURN GB, BB
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B. Pseudocodes for the Everyday malicious pattern-based ROC curves
( TPR, FPR ) ← getEverydayROC ( ip_list, dataset )
TPR ← Ø
FPR ← Ø
degree_threshold = minimum degree
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 )
( ret ) ← isEveryday ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold )
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcEverydayROC ( ip_list, ret )
TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ]
FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ]
INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1
END WHILE
RETURN TPR, FPR

( RET ) ← isEveryday ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold )
RET ← initialize list with TRUEs
FOR each day
FOR each behavior of each node
IF behavior [ node_id ] < degree_threshold
RET [ node_id ] ← FALSE
END IF
END FOR
END FOR
RETURN RET

( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcEverydayROC ( ip_list, isEveryday )
TP ← 0
TN ← 0
FP ← 0
FN ← 0
FOR each isEveryday of the matching ip_list
IF isEveryday [ node_id ] == TURE AND listed in DShield Logs
TP ← TP + 1
ELIF isEveryday [ node_id ] == FALSE AND listed in DShield Logs
FN ← FN + 1
ELIF isEveryday [ node_id ] == TRUE AND not listed in DShield Logs
FP ← FP + 1
ELIF isEveryday [ node_id ] == FALSE AND not listed in DShield Logs
TN ← TN + 1
END IF
END FOR
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TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN )
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP )
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR

C. Pseudocodes for the malicious Average degree pattern-based ROC curves
( TPR, FPR ) ← getAverageROC ( ip_list, dataset )
TPR ← Ø
FPR ← Ø
degree_threshold = minimum degree
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 )
( ret ) ← getAverage ( ip_list, dataset )
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcAverageROC ( ip_list, ret, degree_threshold )
TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ]
FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ]
INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1
END WHILE
RETURN TPR, FPR

( RET ) ← getAverage ( ip_list, dataset )
RET ← initialize list with 0s
FOR each behavior of each node
SUM ← 0
FOR each day
SUM ← SUM + behavior [ node_id ]
END FOR
RET [ node_id ] ← SUM / Number of Days
END FOR
RETURN RET

( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcAverageROC ( ip_list, averages, degree_threshold )
TP ← 0
TN ← 0
FP ← 0
FN ← 0
FOR each average of the matching ip_list
IF averages [ node_id ] ≥ degree_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs
TP ← TP + 1
ELIF averages [ node_id ] < degree_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs
FN ← FN + 1
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ELIF averages [ node_id ] ≥ degree_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs
FP ← FP + 1
ELIF averages [ node_id ] < degree_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs
TN ← TN + 1
END IF
END FOR
TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN )
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP )
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR

D. Pseudocodes for the At Least Once malicious pattern-based ROC curves
( TPR, FPR ) ← getAtLeastOnceROC ( ip_list, dataset )
TPR ← Ø
FPR ← Ø
degree_threshold = minimum degree
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 )
( ret ) ← isAtLeastOnce ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold )
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcAtLeastOnceROC ( ip_list, ret )
TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ]
FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ]
INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1
END WHILE
RETURN TPR, FPR

( RET ) ← isAtLeastOnce ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold )
RET ← initialize list with FALSEs
FOR each day
FOR each behavior of each node
IF behavior [ node_id ] ≥ degree_threshold
RET [ node_id ] ← TRUE
END IF
END FOR
END FOR
RETURN RET

( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcAtLeastOnceROC ( ip_list, isAtLeastOnce )
TP ← 0
TN ← 0
FP ← 0
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FN ← 0
FOR each isAtLeastOnce of the matching ip_list
IF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ] == TURE AND listed in DShield Logs
TP ← TP + 1
ELIF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ] == FALSE AND listed in DShield Logs
FN ← FN + 1
ELIF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ] == TRUE AND not listed in DShield Logs
FP ← FP + 1
ELIF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ] == FALSE AND not listed in DShield Logs
TN ← TN + 1
END IF
END FOR
TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN )
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP )
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR

E. Pseudocodes for the trust-based ROC curves
( TPR_LIST, FPR_LIST ) ← startTrustROC ( ip_list, dataset )
TPR_LIST ← Ø
FPR_LIST ← Ø
trust_threshold ← 0.1
WHILE trust_threshold ≠ 1.0 )
( TPR, FPR ) ← getTrustROC ( ip_list, dataset, trust_threshold )
TPR_LIST ← [ TPR_LIST; TPR ]
FPR_LIST ← [ FPR_LIST; FPR ]
INCREMENT trust_threshold by 0.1
END WHILE
RETURN TPR_LIST, FPR_LIST
( TPR, FPR ) ← getTrustROC ( ip_list, dataset, trust_threshold )
TPR ← Ø
FPR ← Ø
degree_threshold ← minimum degree
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 )
( trust ) ← calcTrust ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold )
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcTrustROC ( ip_list, trust, trust_threshold )
TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ]
FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ]
INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1
END WHILE
RETURN TPR, FPR
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( TRUST ) ← calcTrust ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold )
TRUST ← initialize list with 0s
gb ← initialize list with 0s
bb ← initialize list with 0s
FOR each day
FOR each behavior of each node
IF behavior [ node_id ] < degree_threshold
gb [ node_id ] ← gb [ node_id ] + 1
ELSE
bb [ node_id ] ← bb [ node_id ] + 1
END IF
END FOR
END FOR
TRUST [ node_id ] ← ( gb [ node_id ] + 1 ) / ( gb [ node_id ] + bb [ node_id ] + 2 )
RETURN TRUST

( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcTrustROC ( ip_list, trust, trust_threshold )
TP ← 0
TN ← 0
FP ← 0
FN ← 0
last_day_trust ← last column of the trust
FOR each trust in last_day_trust
IF last_day_trust [ node_id ] ≤ trust_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs
TP ← TP + 1
ELIF last_day_trust [ node_id ] > trust_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs
FN ← FN + 1
ELIF last_day_trust [ node_id ] ≤ trust_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs
FP ← FP + 1
ELIF last_day_trust [ node_id ] > trust_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs
TN ← TN + 1
END IF
END FOR
TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN )
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP )
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR
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F. Pseudocodes for the outlier-based adaptive threshold
( MAX_TH, MIN_TH ) ← getThresholds ( dataset )
delta ← 0.05
sorted_dataset ← sort the dataset in descend order
kappa ← number of data / 4
k←1
WHILE k < Number of data
alpha ← CALL calcModifiedHill ( sorted_dataset, k, kappa )
r_i ← ( 1 - ( 1 – delta ) ^ ( 1 / k ) ) ^ ( -1 / ( alpha * k ) )
R_i ← sorted_dataset [ k ] / sorted_dataset [ k + 1]
IF R_i > r_i
MAX_TH ← sorted_dataset [ k + 1 ]
refined_data ← remove the outliers from the sorted_dataset
MIN_TH ← mean ( refined_data )
RETURN MAX_TH, MIN_TH
END IF
INCREMENT k by 1
END WHILE
RETURN FAIL
( ALPHA ) ← calcModifiedHill ( sorted_dataset, k, kappa )
X_k ← sorted_dataset [ k ]
X_kappa ← sorted_dataset [ kappa ]
log_sum ← 0
log_index ← k
WHILE log_index ≠ ( kappa + 1 )
log_sum ← log_sum + log ( sorted_dataset [ log_index ] )
INCREMENT log_index by 1
END WHILE
ALPHA ← ( ( ( k – 1 ) / ( kappa - ( k – 1 ) ) ) * log ( X_k ) - ( ( kappa – 1 ) / ( kappa ( k – 1 ) ) ) * log ( X_kapa ) + ( 1 / ( kappa - ( k – 1 ) ) ) * log_sum ) ^ ( -1
)
RETURN ALPHA
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G. NPB and MPB for the predictability trust
( NPB, MPB ) ← getEvaluation ( host_degree, port_degree,
h_max, h_min, p_max, p_min )
NPB ← 0
MPB ← 0
day ← 1
WHILE day < (Number of days + 1)
IF host_degree [ day ] >= h_max
h_bb ← 1
h_gb ← 0
ELIF host_degree [ day ] <= h_min
h_bb ← 0
h_gb ← 1
ELSE
h_bb ← 0
h_gb ← 0
END IF
IF port_degree [ day ] >= p_max
p_bb ← 1
p_gb ← 0
ELIF port_degree [ day ] <= p_min
p_bb ← 0
p_gb ← 1
ELSE
p_bb ← 0
p_gb ← 0
END IF
IF ( h_bb == 1 && p_bb == 1 ) || ( h_bb == 1 && p_bb == 0 ) ||
( h_bb == 0 && p_bb == 1 )
NPB ← NPB + 0
MPB ← MPB + 1
ELIF h_gb == 1 && h_bb == 1
NPB ← NPB + 1
MPB ← MPB + 0
ELSE
NPB ← NPB + 0
MPB ← MPB + 0
END IF
INCREMENT day by 1
END WHILE
RETURN NPB, MPB
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APPENDIX II
TABLES
A. Comparisons of the amount of dataset being analyzed in the European
dataset
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2033520
338919
83.3%

2582552
479894
81.4%

2658580
476489
82.1%

2591969
426867
83.5%

1857031
242404
86.9%

1986025
268617
86.5%

2864999
489119
82.9%

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

2983068
513891
82.8%

2841339
523543
81.6%

2884174
523104
81.9%

2639961
458629
82.6%

1990954
264846
86.7%

1970922
283987
85.6%

2762730
523031
81.1%

a) Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between the
original and graph represented in the European dataset
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2033520
449164
77.9%

2582552
569886
77.9%

2658580
561409
78.9%

2591969
532058
79.5%

1857031
366307
80.3%

1986025
408868
79.4%

2864999
593437
79.3%

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

2983068
576659
80.7%

2841339
570111
79.9%

2884174
583733
79.8%

2639961
537062
79.7%

1990954
381646
80.8%

1970922
385751
80.4%

2762730
565519
79.5%

b) Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the original
and graph represented in the European dataset
B. Comparisons of the amount of dataset being analyzed in the URI dataset
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

243790
152678
37.4%

341427
180531
47.1%

280573
176662
37.0%

244027
142146
41.8%

239039
150214
37.2%

143410
80086
44.2%

144945
84414
41.8%

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

267088
169553
36.5%

271934
169272
37.8%

276411
173777
37.1%

268633
167295
37.7%

236520
150696
36.3%

144232
90969
36.9%

160232
96034
40.1%

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

283563
175528

271568
173179

297094
188807

292063
186227

248845
157337

153801
93485

173922
103471
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Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original

38.1%

36.2%

36.5%

36.2%

36.8%

39.2%

40.5%

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

297167
182704
38.5%

285278
175760
38.4%

290520
176831
39.1%

309071
199923
35.3%

49516
34103
31.1%

87645
50921
41.9%

236083
146806
37.8%

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

221660
144689
34.7%

139798
86955
37.8%

149500
89171
40.4%

293320
184082
37.2%

295133
185555
37.1%

294104
185840
36.8%

317198
183723
42.1%

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

266514
174452
34.5%

168503
106587
36.7%

171537
103356
39.8%

314527
194957
38.0%

310587
188491
39.3%

321669
190148
40.9%

305103
181163
40.6%

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

279160
158559
43.2%

200273
93825
53.2%

189714
94090
50.4%

348489
202633
41.9%

320224
181879
43.2%

304232
181016
40.5%

291077
177446
39.0%

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

258292
157300
39.1%

168184
92751
44.9%

171474
90253
47.4%

302885
176488
41.7%

314768
177188
43.7%

327262
186313
43.1%

369205
192132
48.0%

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

315119
170140
46.0%

189703
93570
50.7%

195809
94352
51.8%

317470
185025
41.7%

308328
184978
40.0%

314982
191340
39.3%

299310
181010
39.5%

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

268504
153877
42.7%

181580
90026
50.4%

177183
87145
50.8%

345831
185174
46.5%

232169
133289
42.6%

160125
103928
35.1%

283543
177553
37.4%

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

252928
166431
34.2%

181854
98794
45.7%

148693
95722
35.6%

251745
162970
35.3%

258205
170592
33.9%

262348
171897
34.5%

246732
165830
32.8%

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

231042
157776
31.7%

148227
95782
35.4%

211136
96560
54.3%

335357
156789
53.3%

271628
158284
41.7%

261328
156270
40.2%

281513
175134
37.8%

85

86

87

88

89

90

264349

171762

150282

168142

331850

317282
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Graph
Saved

164315
37.8%

99023
42.4%

82552
45.1%

96148
42.8%

178288
46.3%

160511
49.4%

a) Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between the
original and graph represented in the URI dataset
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

243790
51137
79.0%

341427
70860
79.3%

280573
57723
79.4%

244027
54160
77.8%

239039
49252
79.4%

143410
36872
74.3%

144945
38488
73.5%

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

267088
51476
80.7%

271934
50711
81.4%

276411
50192
81.8%

268633
48844
81.8%

236520
47054
80.1%

144232
37168
74.2%

160232
40263
74.9%

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

283563
51602
81.8%

271568
51352
81.1%

297094
55454
81.3%

292063
56533
80.6%

248845
50321
79.8%

153801
38386
75.0%

173922
41865
75.9%

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

297167
55260
81.4%

285278
53263
81.3%

290520
51917
82.1%

309071
55061
82.2%

49516
10904
78.0%

87645
22935
73.8%

236083
47875
79.7%

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

221660
45951
79.3%

139798
34570
75.3%

149500
36403
75.7%

293320
54196
81.5%

295133
53479
81.9%

294104
53691
81.7%

317198
53663
83.1%

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

266514
51474
80.7%

168503
38008
77.4%

171537
39634
76.9%

314527
54101
82.8%

310587
54374
82.5%

321669
55391
82.8%

305103
52845
82.7%

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

279160
49524
82.3%

200273
36848
81.6%

189714
38360
79.8%

348489
54292
84.4%

320224
55414
82.7%

304232
53412
82.4%

291077
54683
81.2%

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

258292
49866
80.7%

168184
38251
77.3%

171474
36051
79.0%

302885
54035
82.2%

314768
54371
82.7%

327262
56143
82.8%

369205
54397
85.3%

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

315119

189703

195809

317470

308328

314982

299310
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Graph
Saved

50512
84.0%

36271
80.9%

39530
79.8%

56385
82.2%

56927
81.5%

55849
82.3%

54704
81.7%

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

268504
50862
81.1%

181580
37335
79.4%

177183
36893
79.2%

345831
57515
83.4%

232169
42333
81.8%

160125
35329
77.9%

283543
54775
80.7%

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

252928
52090
79.4%

181854
39892
78.1%

148693
39720
73.3%

251745
55448
78.0%

258205
55962
78.3%

262348
56075
78.6%

246732
55283
77.6%

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

231042
51767
77.6%

148227
38159
74.3%

211136
44680
78.8%

335357
65098
80.6%

271628
65982
75.7%

261328
71880
72.5%

281513
75169
73.3%

85

86

87

88

89

90

264349
76600
71.0%

171762
62297
63.7%

150282
54744
63.6%

168142
55458
67.0%

331850
75284
77.3%

317282
73781
76.8%

Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved
Day
Original
Graph
Saved

b) Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the original
and graph represented in the URI dataset
C. The intersections between the adaptive and each static threshold in the hostdegree analysis ROC curves
Static-5
TPR

FPR

Static-7
TPR

FPR

Static-9
TPR

FPR

Day 1

0.783537 0.207009 0.670732 0.154375 0.615854 0.125380

Day 2

0.786996 0.192407 0.710762 0.143458 0.643498 0.115227

Day 3

0.83683

0.197340 0.745921 0.144571 0.650350 0.115227

Day 4

0.78836

0.202299 0.708995 0.149422 0.640212 0.12152

Day 5

0.77

0.271609 0.693333 0.207444 0.6

Day 6

0.791304 0.259221 0.692754 0.194712 0.608696 0.158796

Day 7

0.729282 0.185759 0.646409 0.134352 0.576427 0.107686

Day 8

0.765531 0.184705 0.689379 0.134365 0.607214 0.108346

Day 9

0.769231 0.191047 0.665992 0.14098
187

0.167518

0.603239 0.113393

Day 10 0.740654 0.193691 0.635514 0.143678 0.565421 0.116319
Day 11 0.751351 0.198135 0.686486 0.146777 0.640541 0.118154
Day 12 0.763158 0.268392 0.674342 0.202611 0.595395 0.165226
Day 13 0.744681 0.257072 0.659574 0.192075 0.606383 0.157579
Day 14 0.827703 0.187601 0.756757 0.137017 0.699324 0.109715

D. The intersections between the adaptive and each static threshold in the portdegree analysis ROC curves
Static-5
TPR

FPR

Static-7
TPR

FPR

Static-9
TPR

FPR

Day 1

0.77439

0.202861 0.557927 0.111695 0.542683 0.10423

Day 2

0.780269 0.193573 0.562780 0.11059

Day 3

0.822844 0.187947 0.564103 0.104642 0.550117 0.098941

Day 4

0.78836

Day 5

N/A

N/A

0.513333 0.149677 0.5

Day 6

N/A

N/A

0.527536 0.160788 0.498551 0.153034

0.1894

0.542601 0.105166

0.579365 0.104382 0.558201 0.099076
0.141064

Day 7

0.725599 0.185973 0.506446 0.103004 0.480663 0.097799

Day 8

0.761523 0.172533 0.54509

Day 9

0.748988 0.176256 0.514170 0.095122 0.483806 0.08977

0.092423 0.527054 0.86809

Day 10 0.738318 0.178390 0.502336 0.097056 0.485981 0.091386
Day 11 0.751351 0.183936 0.548649 0.101758 0.535135 0.095109
Day 12

N/A

N/A

0.529605 0.148967 0.513158 0.141639

Day 13

N/A

N/A

0.56383

0.148294 0.542553 0.140574

Day 14 0.790541 0.173059 0.614865 0.0938

188

0.594595 0.088407
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